Italian distribution companies go for IEC 61850 - New!?

I have posted news about the Italian norm CEI 0-16 in 2013 (12 years ago) regarding the use of IEC 61850 for DSO - Distribution System Operators:

Click HERE to see the three old posts.

During the last years I have not seen a lot of discussions regarding Italian DSOs ... maybe I just did not look for it.

By some request today, I searched the internet to see what happened: A LOT ... I guess.

Several up-to-date documents are downloadable for free:

Standards CEI 0-16 and CEI 0-21, TR 57-126 e PAS 57-127

Click HERE for accessing the documents.

One of the key documents is likely: Reference technical rules for the connection of active and passive consumers to the HV and MV electrical networks of distribution Company

<<Standard CEI 0-16 – Versione consolidata di lavoro>>

The document <<Standard CEI TR 57-126>> contains even a SCL File for the IED to be used (guess it is an example; from 2022).

I guess these specifications (for FREE) cover more applications (generation and load) compared to the German FNN Steuerbox (load only; spec for 39 Euro).

Needs further investigation to understand the similarities and differences. Anyway, both use IEC 61850!

After yesterdays post (2025-08-27), I found today (2025-08-28) a nice description of one of the backgrounds for CEI 0-16:

Enabling of frequency control on distributed generation by CEI 0-16 Power Plant Controller: an analysis of the benefits on system’s stability

Click HERE for the 190 page paper ... very helpful

IEC 61850 - What does Free allocation of the Logical Nodes mean?

Often people ask the question: Where should I allocate a specific function (and the corresponding Logical Node) in the hierarchy of: process, bay, substation, regional control center, central control center? 

In the following you will find some description from the Standard IEC 61850-5, a paper from 2001, a question I received the other day, my own brief answer to that question, and two answers from two good friends: Andrea Bonetti (Megger) and Joachim Lange (Solvay).

IEC 61850-5 (Communication requirements for functions and device models; Ed 2022) describes that the allocation is free to allow different architectures and levels were a function (respective a corresponding LN) can be allocated (means implemented).

Excerpt of Clause 9.2.1 Free allocation of Logical Nodes

"The free (arbitrary) allocation of functions or Logical Nodes respectively is not restricted to the common level structure."

The following excerpt of clause 10.1 Need for a formal system description is one of the crucial clauses in the whole standard series IEC 61850:

"Where the data is coming from (sending Logical Node) and is going to (receiving Logical Node), i.e. the static structure of the communication system, has to be engineered or negotiated during the set-up phase of the system. All functions in the IEDs have to know what data to send when and what data they need from functions in other IEDs to be able to fulfill their functions. To control the free allocation of functions respectively Logical Nodes and to create interoperable systems, a strong formal device and system description for communication engineering shall be provided. Such a description (System Configuration description Language) is defined in Part 6 of this standard (IEC 61850-6). This formal description shall also support the data exchange between different tools if applicable."

Be aware that the Logical Nodes are to be understood as a wrapper around a function. In most cases the function as such is behind the facade of the Logical Node. One exception is the Logical Node class FSCH (Schedule). The definition of FSCH contains a well defined state machine that is part of the function of a scheduler.

An old paper from the year 2001 may help you to understand the approach of IEC 61850

The Impact of the coming Standard IEC61850 on the Life-cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations

By Lars Andersson, Klaus-Peter Brand, Wolfgang Wimmer; ABB Power Automation Ltd., Switzerland

Excerpt from the paper:

1. Free allocation of functions [KHS: and therefore free allocation of Logical Nodes]
2. Extension rules to support new functionality
3. Separation of communication from application issues in a well defined manner
4. Description of the station from the application communication point of view.

Click HERE for the paper published in the year 2001.

Question:

Hi Karlheinz,
I’m a system engineer with a question on IEC 61850 in substation automation.
In a ring with all IEDs and two RTUs, are the RTUs only SCADA gateways, or can they also host SAS control logic (e.g., with a T500’s basic logic capability)?
Should a SAS operate autonomously from SCADA or higher-level PLCs, and if so, should the IEC 61850 RTUs implement control logic for outage restoration, load shedding, etc., to ensure autonomy?

Answer from Karlheinz Schwarz

Dear xx,
Thanks for contacting me.
IEC 61850 is independent from centralized or decentralized approach. It depends on the philosophy of the utility how to architect the system. Functions could be in the multi-functional IED (Relay), bay controller, substation controller, SCADA, control center, ...
IEC 61850 may be used to run schedules in control IED right behind the electrical connecting point of a home, factory, ... using the LN FSCH - Scheduling.
In Germany we have the so-called FNN Steuerbox that uses schedules for limiting the power usage ...
Hope that helps.

Answer from Andrea Bonetti

IEC 61850 does not prescribe where control logic must be located (read it as the famous sentence "free allocation of the Logical Nodes").
The decision is up to the system designer and the utility’s operational requirements. If autonomy of the HV ring is desired, logic may be placed in RTUs, bay controllers, or other IEDs so that the system operates without SCADA. Any such requirement would come from utility or regulatory specifications, not from the IEC 61850 standard.

There is no IEC 61850 requirement that mandates where control logic must be located — whether in RTUs, IEDs, or higher-level systems.
IEC 61850 specifies how devices exchange information and how to engineer all of that (SCL engineering), not where the logic resides.
Whether the HV ring is autonomous is purely a system design choice defined by the utility’s operational philosophy, national regulations, or internal standards — not by IEC 61850 itself.
If autonomy is required (e.g., for outage restoration or load shedding without SCADA), the designer can choose to implement logic in RTUs, bay controllers, or other IEDs so they can function without higher-level supervision.
Obviously it depends also on the voltage level. Usually, higher voltage level –> less integration. Lower voltage level à more integration.
But there are exceptions to this rule like always.

Answer from Joachim Lange

In case of classical terminals, neither the terminal number nor the terminal function is defined in any standard. Personally, in case of CFC implication I use UDx baycontrol blocks, defining „my signals“ and a group with the  "GOOSE exchange" signals
- in case of blocking signals like in double busbar structures I do this as well, because I use busbar selective reverse blocking in dependance of position information,
- this means that disconnector positions enables/disables the blocking transmission to its circuit breaker protection.
It is even useful to avoid that a send out blocking signals triggers during test a not involved feeder.
Some grid companies use f.e. blocking signal in combination with breaker failure. This means when signal is not reset in time they trigger the breaker failure protection.
So the CFC function is really case wise.
We have in our house in the UD1 group all signals which are used for bay supervision.
Philosophy: I decentralise load shedding and automation functions into the bay control level ( discrete frequency / voltage levels with hysteresis).
Such bay controller measures autonomously its conditions.
I provide from above (Scada) the enabling/ disabling signals or mode selections ( power level ) or setpoint correction signals.
The advantage is that a single device failure may not impact a hole system.

Note that Andrea Bonetti (Megger), Joachim Lange (Solvay), Dr. Ghada Elbez (KIT), and I will conduct a comprehensive training starting 09.-13. March 2026 Karlsruhe (Germany) and 21.-25. September 2026 Karlsruhe (Germany).
We will provide the details in the next weeks. Stay tuned.

Here are the logos for that training:

Real-time Access to German Generation and Consumption of Electricity

You have real-time access to the German generation and consumption of electricity:




Click HERE for the real-time data access.

Interactive Information about German Power Generation, Load and Export/Import

The German regulator of the electric power network has just opened a new website which gives you a deep inside view in power generation, load and export/import.



Graph from the new website.
Click HERE to access the new website.
Enjoy.
This is a very interesting service ... to see what's going on.

Dubai (UAE): NEW IEC 61850 Seminar for Protection, Control, and Generation

You are invited to register for one of the world leading IEC 61850 Seminars for Protection, Control, and Generation to be conducted by

FMTP, Al-Ojaimi, and NettedAutomation 
in Dubai (UAE) at the Sheraton Dubai Mall of the Emirates
11-13 July 2017

With the focus on protection and control in HV/MV substations, power generation (PV, Wind, DER, Hydro), distribution systems using Client/Server, GOOSE, SV, SCADA and SCL Language covering:

• IEC 61850 / IEC 61400-25 Introduction (Edition 1, 2, and 2.1) and experience after more than 10 years in operation. Where are we today?
• Return of experience, applications and practical demonstrations:
• Protection and Control in Substation Automation
• Engineering and Configuration
• Maintenance
• Monitoring and SCADA system
• Specification of the IEC 61850 protection and control system.
• Through the practical demonstrations, you will learn:
• To handle IEC 61850 relay protections from different vendors and their software tools; to be able to efficiently manage flexibility in engineering and interoperability.
• To use the state of the art IEC 61850 testing tools and equipment to efficiently detect the technical problems and work-out their solutions.
• To understand SCL files, setup clients and servers for MMS communication to SCADA and RTU Systems
• All the presentations are supported by practical examples or demonstrations.

Who should attend?

• Protection and Electrical Engineers (protection, control, engineering, SCADA, asset managers)
• System integrators
• Product managers of vendors
• R&D engineers
• Maintenance personnel
• Experts responsible for network infrastructure

Click HERE for program and registration information.
Click HERE for other training opportunities.

IEC 61850-7-410 Extended Models for Conventional Power Plants

IEC TC 57 just published a FDIS defining extensions for conventional power plants and steam turbines:

IEC 61850-7-410 A1 (57/1607/FDIS): Amendment 1 to IEC 61850-7-410 Ed.2:
Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Part 7-410: Basic communication structure – Hydro-electric power plants – Communication for monitoring and control

Voting closes 2015-10-09.

The following new Logical Node classes are added to the Hydro Power model standard IEC 61850-7-410 Ed2:

LN	Description
ASEQ	Generic control action sequencer
EBCF	Block control function. This LN will represent one physical device that coordinates the control of the thermal pressure of the steam generator and the electrical power regulation of turbine / generator system.
EFCV	Fuel control valve. This LN will represent the physical device of fuel control valve related to the gas turbine in a thermal power plant.
EGTU	Gas turbine production unit. This LN represents the physical device of the GT and the generator combination in a thermal power plant. It is intended as an extended rating plate that allows settings of data. It also acts as a placeholder for the current operating conditions of the unit.
ESCV	Steam control valve. This LN will represent the physical device of inlet control valve of the steam turbine in a thermal power plant.
ESPD	Speed monitoring. This LN is derived from HSPD.
ESTU	Steam turbine production unit. This LN represents the physical device of the ST and the generator combination in a thermal power plant. It is intended as an extended rating plate that allows settings of data. It also acts as a placeholder for the current operating conditions of the unit.
EUNT	Thermal unit operating mode. The present status of the production unit.
FDBF	Dead-band filter. This LN represents a settable filter for dead-band.
FMTX	Trip matrix. This LN represents a matrix for linking various trip functions to equipment that shall be tripped or controlled during a fault.
GUNT	Production unit operating mode. The present status of the production unit.
PTUR	Used for detection of under resistance, e.g. due to stator or rotor earth-faults.
SECW	Supervision of electrical conductivity in water. This logical node represents a system for monitoring of electrical conductivity in water.
TECW	Measurement of electrical conductivity in water. This logical node represents a generic device for measuring the conductivity in water.

DataObjects for settings of, e.g., the LN ESTU comprise:

TurTyp	Turbine type (steam, gas, oil)
SpdRtg	Turbine rated speed [s–1]
TurInert	Turbine moment of inertia J [kgm2]
TurTrsSpd	Maximum transient overspeed [s–1]
TurRwySpd	Runaway speed [s–1]
TurPwrRtg	Rated power in turbine mode [MW ]
FlwRtgTurb	Rated flow in turbine mode [kg/s]
HiPresMax	High pressure inlet maximum pressure [Pa]
IpMax	Intermediate pressure inlet maximum pressure [Pa]
LoPresMax	Low pressure inlet maximum pressure [Pa]
HiPresVlv	High pressure control valve rated oil pressure [Pa]
HpVlvClsTms	High pressure control valve rated closing time [s]
IpVlvPres	Intermediate pressure control valve rated oil pressure [Pa]
MidVlvClsTms	Intermediate pressure control valve rated closing time [s]
LpVlvPres	Low pressure control valve rated oil pressure [Pa]
LpVlvClsTms	Low pressure control valve rated closing time [s]
IcpVlvPres	Intercept valve rated oil pressure [Pa]
MainStmTmpRtg	Turbine rated main steam temperature
RhStmTmp	Re-heat steam temperature
IcpVlvTms	Intercept valve rated closing time [s]

ENTSO-E Strongly Supports IEC 61850 for Substation Automation

ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) wants to become “an important stakeholder in the IEC 61850 improvement process and will actively contribute, mainly through the profiling work of the IEC 61850 standard.”

ENTSO-E has just published an update on their current and future support of IEC 61850.

I very much appreciate the efforts of the European Transmission System Operators!

Click HERE for the latest news.

The electrical power delivery system is composed of many other domains that are beyond the substations in transmission systems:

• Conventional Power Generation
• Wind Power Plants
• Hydro Power Plants
• Distribution systems
• Renewable Energy Resources
• Load centers (like factories, petro chemical plant, …)
• Power quality monitoring
• Virtual Power Plants
• Primary, secondary, and tertiary control
• Load shedding
• …

IEC 61850 is about to be used in all of these application domains – to become a Seamless Information Exchange System.

Many pilot implementations and tests are underway in these domains. Usually using proprietary Information Exchange System, because the main objectives of these projects are mainly related to power system dynamics and stability – one way or the other. Later they figure out: Hey, we have a very successful project … but created many proprietary, non-interoperable Information Exchange Systems.

It is highly recommended to use IEC 61850 from the scratch! Because this is THE standard. There is usually no need to spend money and time to develop something specific for one use case.

On my radar screen I see many people starting to use IEC 61850 – users and vendors … and system integrators. All over.

Resume: ENTSO-E is just ONE of MANY efforts to apply IEC 61850.

Germany Survived the Solar Eclipse 2015 on March 20

During the last days and months there were a lot of discussions and news about a possible blackout during the Solar Eclipse 2015 today. The operators (and the nature) were quite well prepared for the event.

Lesson 1 learned: Nature and Operators did a good job!

Is there another lesson learned? Sure!

Due to the fact that the universe is not made by human beings, we could predict the movement of the sun, the moon and the earth … and thanks to mathematics we could calculate the impact of the sun on a sunny day like today …

Source: ENTSO-E; click HERE for further details provided by ENTSO-E.

The first maximum of PV power feed-in of 13.3 GW was at 9:45 h today. One hour later the minimum feed-in was 5.1 GW at 10:45 h.

Source: SMA, click HERE for the online data (then select March 20, 2015).

Between 10:45 h and 11:45 h the feed-in grew by 11,7 GW. That means 195 MW per minute or 3,25 MW per second. The maximum of the day was 20.3 GW at 12:45 h.

Source: SMA, click HERE for the online data (then select March 20, 2015).

Note that the forecast was very accurate, as can be seen in the following diagram:

Source: TransnetBW; click HERE for the online data.

The forecast of March 13, 2015 (one week before) was some 700 MW higher than the actual value for 13:00 h, as can be seen in the following figure:

Source: TransnetBW; click HERE for the online data.

The transmission companies have spent a lot of money to get a very precise forecast for today – and it worked fine. But these efforts were taken because it was a remarkable day. The forecast may become better – they are still modeling the physical world with laws set by the creator of the nature. The future power system will be impacted by more man-made “laws” that focus more on profit than on physics.

How many power plants have been used today to control the frequency and balance the load and generation? Maybe a few hundred. These power plants are well equipped with remote terminal units and communicate through IEC 60870-5-101 (and some with -104).

The control center are able to control remotely in the context of schedules plant for the day.

Another question is: What if we have to control Millions of decentralized resources (in some years)? What if we have not only 40+ GW Wind Power and 50+ GW PV power installed?? Who will provide the needed schedules for millions of feed-in points? Who and how will we control millions of these resources?

And how will we guarantee that the needed communication links between millions of intelligent devices will operate in a disaster situation? Note: TODAYs Solar Eclipse was far away from a disaster!

And what happens if somebody manipulates the information and information exchange? Even if we limit the active control commands to a very few or forbid them at all. We need to exchange at least situational information: current, frequency, voltage, power factor, or … Who guarantees that the values exchanged can be trusted?

Can we then trust that we know all communication connections that end in a power plant? You would be surprised if you would start to list the communication assets. As an expert recently said: “I have had the same experience as … with respect to finding "unknown" remote access connectivity at almost every facility I have assessed. These include dial-up modems, wireless access points, and network interface cards that IT and Corporate Engineering did not know existed.” Somebody else said: “At another facility we were told that external connections were always unplugged, but we were able to call the equipment at the phone number we saw posted.”

The future of our power delivery system is dependent on millions (instead of hundreds) of power resources, and on human beings that may loose the control over the communication infrastructure or that may compromise the communication and control systems.

Lesson 2 (to be learned by all): Take the communication, secure communication, control, secure control, impact of the physics on the power system and other aspects MORE SERIOUS! Think always how to apply standards – I mean real standards like IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61400-25, IEC 61850, or DNP3.

There is a lot to be accomplished at the engineering level! Power is more than Euros and Dollars … let’s do the job together. We need you all.

All people that have read to this end will agree with me (at least in general).

Thanks for taking your (spare!?) time.

IEC 61850 in Hydro Power Plants (additional information)

Recently I have reported about an example of the use of IEC 61850 in hydro power plant.

As I said then: “Be sure: More to come.” has become true. Additional information can be found here:

Efacec IEC 61850 automation system is in operation since 2013:

Document 1 (Products)
Document 2 (Projects)
Document 3 (Why IEC 61850?)

Founded in 1948, but with a century-long history, Efacec is the largest Group in the electric field financed by Portuguese capital. It employs over 3900 people and is present in more than 65 countries, in five continents.

Other vendors will follow soon.

IEC 61850 in Hydro Power Plants

I have been asked recently about the application of IEC 61850 in Hydro Power Plants. Yes, there is growing interest to apply IEC 61850 conformant monitoring and control systems in the hydro domain.

A nice presentation from (Ingeteam Power Technology S.A.) with the title

HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANTS AUTOMATION USING IEC 61850:
EXPERIENCES AND IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE USER
presented in April 2014

closes with the statement that “IEC 61850 is a valid solution for hydro power plant automation … More than 10 IEC 61850 hydro projects mainly in Spain.”

Click HERE for a nice presentation [pdf, 0.5 MB]

The use of IEC 61850 for conventional power plants is also growing. I have conducted several training courses in 2014 for engineers working in the power plant business.

Be sure: More to come.

Cyber Security in Industrial Control Systems – Is this enough?

Cyber security is more than a hype. Is this enough to reach a secure and stable power system? No!

I found a very good documentation on cyber security measure:

Since February 2013, industrial stakeholders (final users, vendors, integrators, professional organizations, etc.) and French governmental entities have been working together on elaborating concrete and practical proposals to improve the cyber security of critical infrastructures.

The first results of this working group are the following two documents:

• The first document describes a classification method for industrial control systems and the key measures to improve their cyber security.
• The second one gives a more in-depth description of applicable cyber security measures.

Click HERE for the website with the links to the two documents. Nice reading!

These measures (comparable to those listed by many other organizations and groups) will help to improve the cyber security of critical infrastructures. No question.

Do these measures help to keep the power flowing, help to keep a stable and highly available power system? To some extend these measures solve mainly issues that are caused by new control system solutions based on standards like Ethernet and TCP/IP.

But: What’s about the power system stability? Let’s assume that we have a 100 per cent cyber secure ICS managing the power generation, transmission, distribution, storages, and loads. This “secure” systems may be used in many different ways – taking the physical laws seriously into account or ignoring some basic requirements to keep the power system stable.

One very critical impact on the electrical system is the change of power flow. Each change (more or less generation or load) has to be controlled in a bunch of close loop control systems. If the amount of change in a short time (within seconds) is too high, then the systems is likely to black-out.

A highly secure ICS may be used to configure schedules for feeding power into the power system (generator or storage) or drawing power from the system. The power flow change caused by schedules may exceed the maximum value that can be automatically managed by primary power control systems … risking a power outage.

Who is now responsible that the maximum allowable power flow change in an interconnected power system will be taken into account when we have millions of such schedules? Maybe too may schedules are configured to draw power or feed in starting at 14:00 h today. As a consequence the power flow change could be far beyond the maximum amount that can automatically be managed by the primary power control system (as we have them today in all systems).

Cyber security of ICS is one aspect – system stability of the power system is another. Secure ICS’s are important. A high level of power systems stability is more important and requires secure information and communication systems AND the need of understanding of the power system physics. 

We have to make sure that any new ICS approach does not allow a huge sudden power flow change! This is true also for all solutions based on standards like IEC 60870-5-10x, DNP3, IEC 61850, or …

These standards would allow to disseminate immediate control commands or specify schedules.

WHO is in charge to have the big picture in mind – to configure power systems in a way that they do not blackout because of commands and settings communicated by highly secure ICS’s? The power system could not differentiate if these commands or settings are intended or caused by hackers.

It is highly recommended to keep an eye on the power system physics and prevent any ICS action (secure or insecure) to danger the stability of the power system!

IEC 61850-90-13 – New Work on IEC 61850 for Steam and Gas Turbines

The new work item has been introduced in the work programme under the title:
IEC 61850-90-13 Ed.1 (57/1259/RVN):
Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Part 90-13: Extension of IEC 61850 information models to also include logical nodes and data models for steam and gas turbines

IEC 61850 defines very common concepts, information models, services and configuration language that can be used in many other application domains outside substations. MMS – as a basic communication service to which IEC 61850 models and services are mapped – was originally defined for the manufacturing floor (MMS – Manufacturing Message Specification). So it is no surprise that it can be used there and in many other application domains.

One key issue in power plants is the RDS PP (related to KKS):

 

Examples of RDS PP for Wind Power Plants and IEC 61400-25/61850:

Binding of Information Models:

 

Examples from IEC 61850-7-510 (Hydroelectric power plants – Modelling concepts and guidelines):

Step by step we learn that IEC 61850 is in harmony with many other designation standards … and it can be used for almost all online (runtime) information exchange and system and IED configuration.

Denver (CO): Workshop on International Standards for Smart Grids and SCADA Application Domains

A two day Workshop on International Standards for Smart Grids and SCADA Application Domains will be conducted by two gurus of standards for power systems on

September 18 – 19, 2012 – Hyatt Regency Denver (CO) Tech Center

Topics are among others: NIST SGIP standards catalog, IEC 61850, IEC 62351 (security), DNP3, … security measures, solutions, and needs, as well as the global market penetration of standards in power systems, …

Details and registration information for the Smart Grid Standards Workshop can be found here.

If you want to have a specific topic presented and discussed during the workshop, please let me know.

NEW: Embedded Linux Gateway supporting IEC 61850 and IEC 61400-25

SSV Embedded Systems (Hannover, Germany) offers the embedded Linux gateway module DIL/NetPC DNP/9265 now with a preinstalled IEC 61850 (IEC 61400-25)protocol stack. An easy to configure and use IEC 61850 API (application program interface) allows for a very short time-to-market development – within days and weeks. Program your application, model the IEC 61850 logical nodes and data object that expose your application data, bind them together, configure the communication services like data sets and control blocks (reporting and GOOSE) – and you can connect with other IEC 61850 devices. The model, the binding, and the communication services are described in a standard SCL file (System Configuration Language, IEC 61850-6) and uploaded to the module. Restart the module and you are done. It’s that easy.

The ARM9-based DNP/9265 is equipped with 32MB of SDRAM, as well as 32MB of NOR flash for holding the boot-loader and Linux O/S, says the company. I/O is passed through a 40-pin DIL socket, and includes three UARTs for COM functions, as well as 20-bit GPIO.

The module supplies one interface each for USB 2.0 Host, SD card, I2C, SPI, and CAN (ISO/11898A 2.0B), says the company. A 10/100Mbps Ethernet port is also supported. Additional features include a watchdog timer, power supervisor for VCC control, and in-system programming features.

Measuring 2.17 x 0.91 inches (55 x 23mm), the module runs on a 3.3 Volt power supply, with supply current at typically 300mA, with a maximum of 500mA. The module is said to support temperatures ranging from 32 to 158 deg. F (0 to 70 deg. C).

SSV also offers other DIL/NetPC-based gateway box products for smart grid and virtual power plant applications. These gateways allow to connect distributed generation installations (such as CHPs, wind-turbines, small hydro, back-up gensets etc.) directly via IEC 61850 with any other application like power grid monitoring or control centers.

In addition to Linux and the integrated IEC 61850 the SSV gateway solutions comes with drivers and protocol stacks for SSL- or IPsec-based VPNs (virtual private networks). This allows secure data communication with powerful encryption technologies over the public telecommunication infrastructure, such as the Internet.

Click HERE for the news [in German]
Click HERE for a description of the product [in English]
Click HERE to check the IEC 61850 (IEC 61400-25) API online [in English]