What is IEC 61850-8-1 MMS Compared to IEC 61850-8-3 DMS?

The paper "The Standard Message Specification for Industrial Automation Systems ISO 9506 (MMS)" has been downloaded 6,691 times from the ResearchGate ... seems to be an interesting document. 

Now, since we are working on a new protocol standard for IEC 61850-7-2 Client/Server communication (IEC 61850-8-3, DMS, Direct Message Specification), the question is: What is the difference between MMS and DMS?

Here are some answers:

DMS will be an alternative protocol for MMS ... with WebSocket connectivity, ASN.1 message schema, ASN.1 JER JSON encoding, ... very simple ... a straight forward from IEC 61850-7-2 ACSI (abstract messages) to concrete messages ... 1:1 ... no tricks ...

There are a few crucial aspects: (1) MMS as a standard that needs outdated OSI upper layers, (2) MMS is very complex and does not easily fit for IEC 61850-7-2 ACSI ... needs a tricks mapping to MMS in IEC 61850-8-1, (3) DMS communicates over WebSockets (bidirectional), (4) DMS uses JSON for message encoding (or DER binary) many tools are available, (5) the message schema of DMS is far simpler than the MMS message schema ... even both are using ASN.1 as schema notation, (6) MMS is not a good friend of many experts, (7) the Proof of Concept for RTI2 (Netherlands DSOs) is the basis for IEC 61850-8-3 ... and available at GitHub ...

From an system point of view (engineering, SCL, Models, abstract services, ... application functions, ...) there is no difference between the two protocols. From a smart implementation point of view the "stacks" could have an API that is independent of the protocols. There needs to be a tiny layer that decides if, e.g., a Report (with the payload from the application models) is wrapped with MMS or DMS ... for DMS there are two options: JER (JSON) and DER (binary) ... from a DMS stack point of view there is one line of code (!!) that is needed to encode in JSON or binary ...

Of course, the MMS message syntax and encoding are not compatible with DMS message syntax and encoding. BUT: they both carry the same payload!! ... thanks to the huge list of standardized "Signals" (models).

Both solutions run on TCP/IP ... there may be multi-protocol IEDs available some time down the road ... as we see today that many IEDs are supporting multiple protocols ... 

People asked me: Why did you not have this solution developed earlier?!? I developed something with my granddaughter when she did her Bachelor at KIT ... check my blog with some historical discussions

IEC published the Committee Draft (57/2980/CD) on IEC 61850-8-3

The next step of the publication of IEC 61850-8-3 has been reached

Yesterday (2026-09-04) IEC published the Committee Draft (57/2980/CD) on

"Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Part 8-3: Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) –
Mapping to Direct Message Specification (DMS), JSON Encoding Rules, and WebSockets"

The commenting period closes on 2026-10-30 ... very soon.

All experts that are members of the IEC TC 57 National Committees can access the document and provide comments online.

My experience with the editing processing tool (OSD - Online Standards Development) is very positive: After I finished the editing on Monday (2026-08-31) IEC could easily publish the CD ... the document follows automatically the format of IEC ... because it is an IEC (ISO) tool ... perfect.

The crucial definition is the ASN.1 message schema that is used to code and decode messages (see see below for a link to the ASN.1 schema used in the RTI2 open-source software):

The committee draft (57/2980/CD) is based on the Netherlands Netbeheers Proof of Concept for RTI2 (real-time interface). Netbeheer is supporting the implementation as open-source software under GitHub. The message syntax of the committee draft is the latest ASN.1 module. The ASN.1 version at GitHub is a pre-version of the official version:
General: https://github.com/Netbeheer-Nederland/iec61850-websocket

Direct Access to the ASN.1 Schema: https://github.com/Netbeheer-Nederland/iec61850-websocket/blob/main/src/ws61850/asn1/schema/ws_iec61850_tpaa_full.asn

Please check my blog for additional information on IEC 61850-8-3.
Any question? Please let me know.

Siemens PCS7 (TIA) PowerControl Station Gateway connects PLCs with IEC 61850 IEDs

In a post earlier today I wrote: "It does not make sense to decouple power systems from big(ger) applications." ... this reminded me to discuss another use case ... factory automation to substation ...

Siemens offers PLCs with the PCS7 family. They have developed gateways that bring the substation closer to the power user ... 

PCS 7 PowerControl Station Gateway connection of a SIPROTEC 5 protection device (speaking IEC 61850!)

The brochure states at the beginning: "In addition to the demanding process automation requirements in many industrial plants, it is also necessary to integrate the medium-voltage power supply switchgear into a complete automation system.

Components of such plants are electrical consumers with high energy requirements (factories, chemocal plants, ...). Individual consumers are monitored and controlled via protection devices, also known as IEDs (intelligent electronic devices)."

So, my statement on the post earlier today has been confirmed! 

The same is available for the integration of a substation into a Siemens TIA (Totally Integrated Automation) ... TIA Station Gateway: excerpt of that page:

"With the new IEC 61850 server functionality, you can extend your station gateway integration allowing you to reliably publish process data directly to IEC 61850 clients via GOOSE Publisher or MMS polling and reporting with a high degree of performance. Whether protection systems, instrumentation and control or automation environments: The publisher ensures that events are quickly transferred and facilitates fixed data models and the highest degree of interoperability."

WOW.

IEC 61850 covers applications inside substations AND beyond substations

IEC 61850 is applicable for general automation applications as well as for electric power delivery systems. The following lists give an impression of what kind of domains are taken into account so far ... more to come:

Information models and exchange for

• real-time and near real-time applications  (pub/sub: GOOSE, Sampled Values)
• protection
• monitoring, supervision, and control (client/server TCP/IP and WebSocket)
• substation and feeder equipment
• substation-to-substation
• substation-to-control centre
• power plant-to-control centre
• distributed generation
• distributed energy resources
• micro grids
• metering
• power quality
• condition monitoring
• hydro, steam, gas power plants
• wind generation plants
• data centers
• …

System Configuration and engineering

• System Configuration Language (SCL)
• Basic Application Profiles
• top-down-engineering (model-based engineering)
• - …

These lists demonstrate that the standard series IEC 61850 covers applications inside substations AND beyond substations. One crucial question remains: What are the logical nodes and data objects ... from which parts of the standard series IEC 61850 are required for a specific application domain?
The answer is here: ask me.

HERE you can find a sample model for an IEC 61850 Profile for Distributed Energy Resources Supporting IEEE 1547 [pdf] ... quite interesting ...

You may search the web for MICS (IEC 61850 model implementation conformance Statement) ... 

Note that substations are very crucial components of the interconnected electric energy systems.

Let me know if you need some help.

How are IEC 61850 Information Models related to Functions?

The common understanding of information is crucial for the understanding of the related functions that produce, consume, and exchange the information. Information is always "bound" to functions ... no function - no information.

Let's have a look at this function: 

Supervision of a temperature value ... report an alarm to a well known entity when the temperature change rate reaches a value of xyz ... this is the FUNCTION. Now we model it with IEC 61850:

The temperature supervision is modeled in the logical node MySTMP1. We use the data objects Tmp (reported every x minutes), RteAlm (reported when the value of the RteAlmSet is reached, e.g., 0.5 K/s).

This "function" is described in an SCL document ... here the MySTMP1 is bound to a topology (SSD), e.g., room temperature in building so-and-so, the reports are sent to the SCADA system mySCADA-client, ... the factory acceptance test can more or less be automated based on the SCL document.

The IEC 61850 STMP logical node model follows the temperature supervision function!! 

The function was there well before IEC 61850 was born!

IEC 61850 standardizes the information shared with a real function.

The following diagram shows the basic modelling approach in IEC 61850:

• IEC 61850-7-2 defines the foundation
• IEC 61850-7-3 defines the common data classes: MV for measurements, SPS for single point status, and ASG for analogue sessings.
• IEC 61850-7-4 defines the logical node and data object classes.

More details will follow ... stay tuned.

The real challenge with IEC 61850 is: You likely get the feeling when you start reading hundreds of pages: unable to see the wood for the trees.

Let me know if you need help ... after 30 years I can support you.

IEC 61850 for Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)

With the growth of planning and installation of BESS the question is discussed, how IEC 61850 could contribute. A lot!

Have a look at three posters that depict the architecture of an electric system that includes batteries ... with some comments from me:

Poster 1
Poster 2
Poster 3

See also a paper on the use of IEC 61850-7-420 (DER) from the year 2014.

Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Part 7-420: Basic communication structure –
Distributed energy resources and distribution automation logical nodes

Preview of IEC 61850-7-420 (2021).

A few excerpts:

The DER storage Logical Nodes in IEC 61850-7-420 have hundreds of Data Objects ... see just a few:

IEC TC 57 offers a name space document listing the syntax of all logical nodes and data objects:

That (light) name space is an xml document with 5520 lines !!! The light name space contains the syntax of the models ... the textual semantic is missing ... comes with the purchase of the standard IEC 61850-7-420.

I am confident that IEC 61850 offers the most crucial information models for BESS.

The PAC World Magazine Reports From the 30 Year Anniversary of IEC 61850 in September 2025

The 30 year anniversary of IEC 61850 in September 2025 was a big success.

The report mentions me: "The presentations were bracketed by the first one from Karlheinz Schwarz about how all of this started in the past Millenium ..."

I am very thankful for the invitation by Dr. Fred Steinhauser (Omicron) to speak about the history ... 

Click HERE for the Report in the PACW.

Click HERE for more photos and a link to my "Millenium" presentation.

When browsing the Web, I see many more papers, reports, posts, ... on IEC 61850 for substations and for applications beyond substations.

More to come: With IEC 61850-8-3

New Work Item Proposal on IEC 61850-8-3 has been accepted by 95 % of the TC 57 National Committees

In December 2025 the NWIP (57/2866/NP - proposed project number: IEC 61850-8-3) was published for voting and comments:
https://blog.nettedautomation.com/2025/12/long-awaited-christmas-gift-for-smarter.html

Today we are happy that the NWIP has been approved by IEC - only one country disagreed in the voting process.

IEC 61850-8-3
Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) –
Mapping to Direct Message Specification (DMS), JSON Encoding Rules, and WebSockets 

The result of this work will very likely change the usability of IEC 61850 outside substations.

Stay tuned to follow the progress.

In order to explain details of the new approach to be used for the new work item proposal IEC 61850-8-3 I have produced a 17 minute video (2026-05-13).

Long Awaited Christmas Gift For Smart(er) Grids - IEC 61850-8-3 is on its Way

In order to explain details of the new approach to be used for the new work item proposal IEC 61850-8-3 I have produced a 17 minute video. (2026-05-13)

IEC TC 57 just published a long awaited and crucial new work item proposal: 

57/2866/NP - proposed project number: 61850-8-3

Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) –
Mapping to Direct Message Specification (DMS),
JSON Encoding Rules, and WebSockets 

Closing date for voting on the NP: 2026-03-06

"IEC 61850-8-3 Ed.1 defines the direct mapping of the client/server services of the ACSI (Abstract Communication Service Interface) defined in IEC 61850-7-2. Direct mapping means that for every abstract client/server service of the ACSI a concrete message schema (for the request and the response) is defined in ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation One). ...

The encoding of the messages according to IEC 61850-8-3 is using the ASN.1 JER (JSON Encoding Rule, ISO/IEC 8825-8:2021). The messages are exchanged through WebSocket (RFC 6455, The WebSocket Protocol). WebSocket is a communication protocol that enables a persistent, full-duplex communication channel over a single TCP connection, allowing both the client and server to send data to each other at any time. This differs from the standard HTTP request-response model, making it ideal for real-time applications."

Please contact your national IEC TC 57 committee for a copy of the NP.

The main differences between IEC 61850-8-1/8-2 and 8-3 are shown in the following table:

and here:

Enjoy!

Click HERE for additional information that discusses the need for a modern messaging solution ...

I look forward to continuing the editing work of this new part of IEC 61850. This closes the circle of my contribution to communication protocols: starting in the mid 1980s with MMS (base for IEC 61850-8-1/8-2) and now (40+ years later) involved in a modern approach using web technologies ... Wow ...

This NP is the result of a Proof of Concept (PoC) initiated and managed by the Netherlands Distribution System Operators (Netbeheer). I played a little role in the implementation of this PoC. The PoC demonstrated the great benefit that can be harvested from the solution!

It is very likely that this part IEC 61850-8-3 (once it is finished) will accelerate the application of IEC 61850 outside the substation domain. I have discussed IEC 61850 outside of substations for many years ... Let me know what you think.

I wish you a merry Christmas and the best for the year 2026.

6th Power Systems Protection Summit (PS2) coming soon

Dissemination of information about IEC 61850 is crucial. One opportunity to listen to an online (virtual) conference is the Middle East 

6th Power Systems Protection Summit (PS2)
September 15–16, 2025

Click HERE for program information.

On day 2 I will give a keynote speech:

Keynote session - IEC 61850 is the Corner Stone of manageable Secure Power Systems
11:00AM - 11:20AM

IEC 61850 has come a long way since mid-1990.  A wide range of applications built with IEC 61850 will act as a game changer for traditional protection, automation, and SCADA products and systems. It aims to provide all parties involved with as much standardized information as possible for power systems. 

I look forward to meeting you virtually.

Object Modeling in the late 1980s - Too Early!

One of the crucial aspects of the standard series IEC 61850 is about object modeling ... first versions have been published in the year 2004 ... guess you agree!

Did you know that object modeling for process automation was already defined to some degree in the late 1980s for the standard ISO/IEC 9506-6 (MMS Companion Standard for Process Control) - published in the year 1994? Maybe you are surprised ... you may even have been born after that time ... 

The other day I have documented the following example of supervision of rate change of a process measurement:

On the bottom the MMS Named Variable C_PVRCPAP is shown. The semantic (setting for a specific event) is equivalent to the "Temperature rate alarm trigger level setting" of the LN class STMP in IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2.1. The definition in MMS part 6 is generic and applies to any measurement.

I would say that the MMS companion standard ISO/IEC 9506-6 was some 30 years too early published ... mainly due to the fact that many engineers did not understand abstract object modeling. 

History repeats itself, which is good because most people don't pay attention the first time anyway.

And today? Hope you have a better understanding! In case you need help ... let me know.

The semantic of the huge amount of signals in IEC 61850 or the few in the old ISO/IEC 9506-6 make the difference compared to most protocols like IEC 60870-5-104 and ... 

IEC 61850-7-410 ED3 CDC - Hydroelectric Power Plants Available for Public Commenting

Please note that last Friday IEC TC 57 has published the following Committee Draft for Vote (CDV) (57/2750/CDV) for comments by National Committees AND for public commenting by anybody before April 04, 2025:

IEC 61850-7-410 ED3: Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - Part 7-410: Basic communication structure - Hydroelectric power plants - Communication for monitoring and control 

To comment on the CDV please click HERE. If you have not yet an account you can register ... if you have an account, go on. (IEC reports: Please use Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge).

IEC Public Commenting is a chance to let your voice be heard before the final vote.

This draft is a major step forward to get an international standard for hydroelectric power plants, steam and gas turbines.

Default Passwords May Cause Some Issues - Change Them As Soon As Possible

 A friend of mine reported the following in a SCADA and cyber-security related group:

"The recent cyber-attack on that small water facility outside of Pittsburg is getting increased attention (certainly on this list) . The model and manufacturer of the device in question are known.  The manufacturer's web site has some  documentation on the device, but I do not think they provide the  device's default password.

No need to look hard, it is listed in plain site on CISA's bulletin (below)."

Exploitation of Unitronics PLCs used in Water and Wastewater Systems Release Date November 28, 2023 

Oops.

PhD Student Working On Cyber Security In Critical Infrastructures

Fredrik Heiding (PhD Student) wrote the other day:

Fredrik Heiding, PhD StudentNetwork and Systems Engineering
KTH, Royal Institute of Technology

I am doing a PhD on cyber security in critical infrastructure. Currently I study the security trends for critical infrastructures in Europe, analyzing where it is heading and how it is developing. To strengthen the study I have identified seven general questions, they are general in nature so they can be answered by people in critical positions without revealing sensitive information.

Here are the Questions from Fredrik and Answers from a very senior expert:

Vytautas Butrimas

Cybersecurity consulting

See also: http://blog.nettedautomation.com/2020/06/scada-security-matters-should-matter.html
Vytautas Butrimas wrote in the introduction to his answers:

This a particularly interesting time in CIP. I come from and IT background and have focused mostly on the cybersecurity of industrial control systems in the past 10 years. This has been a long learning curve for I found that my IT knowledge did not provide enough to understand the engineering and laws of physics that are dominant in the monitor and control of physical processes found in the pumps and compressors on fuel pipelines, treatment of drinking water, routing of trains, and the generation and distribution of electricity. One needs to know the implications and peculiarities between working IT office time and real time to work in this field.
I looked at your questions and will give brief answers.  If you wish to further discuss them with me then we can do so offline.

---------------------------------

Question 1:

What concerns for the future do you have regarding cyber security in critical infrastructure?

Answer 1:

How the introduction of increased complexity of systems (systems of systems, adding more sensors, increased connectivity) will be managed without taking away from safety, reliability and performance.

Question 2:

Over the past decade, digital attacks have become more central to the security of critical infrastructure. Do you think the trend will continue to increase or culminate?

Answer 2:

There are some signs that things will get better but at the same time they will get more complicated.  Security practitioners need to realize that much more attention is needed where the physical process is taking place and the devices closest to it that are monitoring and controlling it, not where they are being monitored by humans in a remote location or control room.  ** One more thing we should not just be focused  on „ATTACKS“.  We also have to consider unintended actions or accidents. As the complexity of systems and connectivity of devices increases so will the unintended or „why did that happen?“ incidents.***

Question 3:

What relevant research or technological advances do you find most interesting for the future?

Answer 3:

Have to think about this one.  It feels we are all trying to keep afloat in a tsunami of technological advances.  The ones that worry me the most are the new features which also come with vulnerabilities that need to be addressed before a malicious group decides to exploit them.

Question 4:

Do you see IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things) as an opportunity or a concern, if both, which part is greatest (positive or negative)?

Answer 4:

I see it mostly as a concern (see my earlier answers). I suggest watching a video available on youtube called "Brave New Internet 4.0 " by one of your famous countrymen, Ralph Langner.  The questions and concerns he raised in that lecture IMHO have not been addressed.

Question 5:

Do you have plans to, or do you think that you will expand the cyber security department in the coming years?

Answer 5:

I am currently working my out of "mandatory retirement" and am not in position in expand anything (perhaps later this year I will change my answer).  If I was in a position of influence at an operator of CI (energy sector for example) I would do my best to set up some support for the senior engineer of the plant.  When he sees something unusual going in the operation he should be able assign this problem to an security operation center. Could be at least one person or a small team that understands cyber threats and how they could be applied to the engineering side of the operation.  The senior plant engineer has to keep things running and does not have time to stop and investigate something.  He needs someone to help him and a ICS SOC could be a good solution is management is willing to spend the money for the positions and training.

Question 6:

Can you share anything about past attacks/intrusion attempts, both successful and unsuccessful attempts are interesting?

Answer 6:

Look at the freely available information on line. Look up Ralph Langer to learn about STUXNET. It happened 10 years ago and this is probably the most analyzed and documented incident we have today that is publicaly  available.  Much can still be learned for the methods continued to be applied today. In 2014 in Germany your government (BSI) published its yearly report on cyber incidents.  There is a section devoted to a cyber attack on a steel mill that had an uncontrolled shutdown and resulted in damage. Look at Triton/Trisis/Hatman incident of 2017 where the safety systems of a petrochemical plant tripped not one but twice. Look for video lectures on this from Dale Pedersons S4 conferences in 2018/2019 (see lecture by Julian Gustmanis and by Schneider Electric)

Question 7:

Has the attitude towards cyber security changed in the last 5 years, why and in which way/

Answer 7:

The attitude is changing and for the better. Much better in the engineering community who have  understood how threats from cyberspace can get into their operations. On the other hand as far as government policy makers go they still have a long way to go. Much technical expertise has left government for the private sector leaving some governments blind to some issues. The 3 Little Pigs problem is evident where one thinks one has taken the appropriate measures and build a house of straw or of sticks to protect from the wind and the rain but the possibility of their being a wolf is somehow missed.  You would be surprise at how many government policy makers do not know what scada is and yet think they are doing a great job at protecting critical infrastructure.

--------------------------------

SCADA Security Matters Should Matter

The SCADA Security and Cybersecurity of critical infrastructure challenges are growing very fast. In order to follow a great source of information provided by a gray hair senior expert please visit the following pages:

http://linkedin.com/in/vytautas-vytas-butrimas-01116a18

http://scadamag.infracritical.com/index.php/author/vytautas/

Learn what the expert Mr. Vytautas (Vytas) Butrimas has to say.

Wish us all power systems that are hardened to withstand any attack from inside and outside!

Stay safe!

Is Industry 4.0 Really a Revolution? And IEC 61850?

There are so many discussions, concerns, arguments ... Pros and Cons regarding Industry 4.0 or the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4.0, IoT, IIoT, Cloud, Edge, data lake, ...).

The most remarkable statements I have heard are from Mr. Ralph Langner who does not believe that it is a revolution at all ...

"Is Industrie 4.0 actually the 4th Industrial Revolution as touted by it's many proponents. Ralph Langner tackles that question in this 20 minute video from S4xEurope."

Click HERE for the youtube video of his presentation (20 min)

Please find some personal opinions:

Please find a paper discussing the "sprint" versus "marathon" in automation of electric power systems I wrote in 2012 through the following post:

http://blog.nettedautomation.com/2012/03/smart-grids-19th-century-invention.html

Here is part of my experience:

I was (as a 21 year old skilled worker in 1973 ... just married) responsible for maintaining a fire alarm system with 6,000 alarm buttons (from a famous vendor ... full of TTL chips ...). The system stopped almost every night ... I had to drive downhill 60 km ... to switch it off and on and go back home ... I was not skilled enough to do anything serious about it ... just wrote reports to my boss ... he ignored everything ... I quit my job in 1974 and went back to high school in January 1995 and university in 1977 ... 7 1/2 years later I finished university with four kids in 1982 ... went back to that same company ... quit again in 1992 partly, in 1997 completely ...

The most crucial reason to quit in 1992/1997 was: The standardization of industrial communication systems in IEC TC 65 released a myriad of non-interoperable Fieldbusses ... good for selling standards ... very BAD for maintenance people and many others ... can you imagine to be an expert in tens of fieldbusses?!

Check out this post:
http://blog.nettedautomation.com/2017/04/iec-sc-65c-published-5000-pages-of-new.html

Oh my dear ...

I just checked my personal records from the 70s and found the weekly reports of my daily maintenance activities ... spent many days to switch off/on the Fire Alarm System ...

This may happen every hour these days where maintenance people just switch IEDs off and on ... in the hope that it will work after restart.

We need more well educated and skilled experts!!! ... grey hair seniors ...

What's about IEC 61850? Is the introduction of this standard series different compared to the fieldbus standard series IE 61158? Sure ... there is a crucial difference:

MANY Fieldbus standards for ONE application (real-time data exchange) ...

ONE IEC 61850 for MANY applications (real-time, protection, asset data, configuration, engineering, ...SCADA, ...).

IEC 61850 series is quite comprehensive and complex ... Yes. But: it seems to be easier to learn and experience ONE complex standard than to do this for 50+ solutions!! IEC 61850 is not a revolution - it could be used to extend existing solutions ... it provides a new approach that could prevent the proliferation of hundreds of vendor-specific solutions ...

And when it comes to security, there is ONE standard series (IEC 62351) for IEC 61850, IEC 60870-6 (TASE.2), IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3, ... 

Draft IEC TR 61850-90-18 on Alarm Handling Published

IEC TC 57 just published a new 50 page draft part of IEC 61850 (57/2157/DC):

IEC Draft TR 61850-90-18
Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Part 90-18: Alarm handling in IEC 61850 based systems

Comments are expected by Nov 29, 2019.

Work is done by TC 57/WG 10 together with TC 88/JWG 25 (Wind Turbines).

This part defines a methodology to handle alarms. The crucial concept is defining an “Alarm Server”.

Use-cases considered are related to:
WG 10: IED communications & associated data models in power systems
WG 17: Distributed Energy Resources
WG 18: Hydroelectric power plants
JWG 25: Wind Power

Sample Use case: Wind power system
"Several clients connected either to an alarm concentrator handling alarms from a system of
identical distributed IED’s or directly to one specific IED. Some of the alarms are defined as
latched and all alarms are defined either with or without acknowledgement.
If a wind turbine is maintained and thus in service state, all alarms must still be captured and
exposed, but marked with an “in-service” flag for filtering (and not to be annunciated).
The IED’s may either be proprietary devices or comply with IEC 61850.
Domain: Common in wind-power domains."

Dangerous Situation in the European Electric Power System Caused by "frozen" Measurements

Measurements of power flow (Watts in export or import) are very crucial for Load Frequency Controller … wrong (i.e., “frozen”!) measurements have caused almost a big blackout in Europe in January 2019.
What happened: the measurement of power of the lines between two transmission systems (Germany – Austria) were frozen when the export value of 723 MW from Germany to Austria was measured (which was a result of 34 GW wind power generation in Germany). Later the wind power generation decreased to 4 GW … and the measurement (as input to the controller) many hours later still used the input value of 723 MW !!! In such a meshed power network it is unlikely that such a value is constant …

Oops … something went absolutely wrong!

Report by exception (on a value change as used for the above measurement) is great … as long as there are changes figured out and reported. A frozen value does not cause a change and thus no new value will be reported … No receiver should expect that the export power is constant (723 MW) for days!! The sensors may have worked fine … but the software and communication failed … on both sides (sender and receiver). A receiver should not trust that the software and communication is working fine all time.
Here are some measures to monitor the communication (by the receiver) to figure out if the communication is OK:

1. Ping (in case of TCP/IP) (if no response after some time: raise flag)
2. TCP Keep-alive (if no keep-alive message in t bigger keep-alive: raise flag)
3. Polling by receiver (if no response after some time: raise flag)
4. Periodic reporting (if no report in t greater period: raise flag)
5. In case of no message received in a configured time period (in case of using IEC 61850 Reporting) the receiver should check if the report control block is enabled and is using the correct configuration values like trigger option, …
6. Check if the sequence of received values are plausible
7. Use redundant systems (comm, …)
8. …

Check out the official Entso-E report (with links to more details):

https://www.entsoe.eu/news/2019/05/28/entso-e-technical-report-on-the-january-2019-significant-frequency-deviations-in-continental-europe/

This reminds me on the Boeing 737 MAX disaster … maybe a programmer left the vendor of the load frequency controller and hired with Boeing … I am kidding.

How many programmer or people that configure power control systems and communication systems that lack experience with complex systems like a plane or a power system. Where are the “grey-hair” experts that would tell you in minutes how to … ? They may enjoy the beach with warm water and sun shine – relax and spend the pension for ...

It is not sufficient to have no ideas – one should also be unable to implement them.

I expect that more of these problems will hit the street once we have far more control, monitoring and communication in the smart(er) grids of medium and low voltage. Note that the problem in January 2019 occurred at transmission level!! … where more resources (higher budgets) are available (in the past).

Have a great weekend – with power.

Omicron offers new ways for IEC 61850 Substation Automation System testing

Testing the automation, control, and SCADA communication in IEC 61850 Substation Automation System (SAS) is as time consuming as testing the protection – or often even more.

StationScout simplifies the testing and reduces the required effort significantly.

With its powerful functions, StationScout is a specialist for the whole lifecycle of a SAS – from engineering to continuous maintenance. The clear status overview provides ideal support for commissioning and maintenance engineers during the different tasks in Substation Automation Systems utilizing IEC 61850.

Key features:

Status overview: StationScout provides a clear overview of the substation, visualizing the communication according to IEC 61850 in SCL files, values and states in the substation.

Signal tracing: The communication diagram of StationScout allows for signal tracing, from the overview down to the detailed communication message attributes.

Automated testing: StationScout is able to re-use predefined test plans for an automated testing procedure.

Cyber security: The dedicated hardware of StationScout ensures cyber secure operation within the substation communication network.

Simulation: The powerful simulation features of StationScout simplify testing and commissioning. Missing IEDs and IOs can also be simulated.

Defining own names: IEC 61850 abbreviations are quite cryptic. Defining of own names in StationScout allows for comfortable asset handling.

Click HERE for detailed information about the StationScout (English)
Click HERE for detailed information about the StationScout (German)

CEWE Instruments Exhibits a new Meter with IEC 61850 Interface

CEWE Instruments exhibits at the Hanover Fair the Prometer 100 family of high-precision four-quadrant energy meters with advanced measuring, logging, power quality monitoring and data storage capabilities.
Prometer 100 supports flexible and modular communications options enabling integration with existing AMR/AMI/SCADA systems, and provides an upgrade path to future substation automation systems (SAS).

Logical Nodes supported: LLNO, LPHD, MMXU, MMTR, MHAI, MABT

Please note that the meter has been certified by the UCAIUG for IEC 61850 compliance.

Visit CEWE at Booth (B09, Hall 12) at the Hannover Messe (23.-27. April 2018)

Click HERE for more information.
Cliock HERE if you need a ticket for the fair in Hanover.