IEEE P3416, Relay Test Sets, and the IEC 61850 View

My dear friend Andrea Bonetti (Megger), Chair of IEC TC 95 (measuring relays, protection equipment, and protection functions) and Vice Chair of IEEE P3416 (relay test set for ...), has recently published a paper on the IEEE P3416 project together with Cord Mempel (Omicron), Hong Wang (State Grid Corporation of China), Jinlei Xing (Schneider Electric), Jun Verzosa (Doble), Thierry Bardou (Schneider Electric) and Xicai Zhao (NARI Electric).

The paper is titled
IEEE P3416 as a Bridge Between IEEE/IEC Protection Testing Methodologies and Relay Test Set Capability 

It was presented at IEEE GPECOM 2026 in Naples and it is now available on IEEEXplore.

The work on IEEE P3416 is progressing, and hopefully the project can be finalized by the end of 2026.

I am not a protection engineer. For protection topics I usually refer to Andrea, who is deeply involved in IEC TC 95 work on measuring relays and protection equipment. My own interest is mainly from the IEC 61850 point of view: what does this project mean for digital substations, communication, interoperability, test systems and engineering?

From that perspective, IEEE P3416 is very interesting.

Andrea and I have conducted many seminars in Europe, Asia, Asia Pacific, ... and we are offering together a training in Karlsruhe (Germany) soon.

Protection testing is no longer only a question of injecting analogue currents and voltages into a relay and checking whether the relay trips. This is still important, of course, especially because many conventional substations and many conventional relays will remain in service for many years. But the world of protection testing is changing. In IEC 61850-based systems, the interface to the protection function may include Sampled Values, GOOSE messages, time synchronization and digital engineering information.

This is where the link to IEC TS 60255-216-1 becomes important.

IEC TS 60255-216-1 deals with protection functions using digital communication as input and output. In practical terms, this includes protection functions subscribing to Sampled Value streams instead of receiving conventional analogue inputs, subscribing to GOOSE messages such as breaker position or breaker failure signals, publishing GOOSE messages such as trip signals, and using time synchronization messages.

This is a very important step. IEC 61850 defines the communication and information exchange mechanisms. IEC 60255-216-1 applies these mechanisms to protection functions. IEEE P3416 then looks at the test sets and tools that are needed to test such protection functions in a reliable, repeatable and documented way.

For an IEC 61850 person, this is the interesting bridge.

A relay test set in the digital substation is not only a current and voltage source. It may also need to publish Sampled Values, subscribe to GOOSE, publish GOOSE, handle timing correctly, use engineering information, support test libraries, automate test sequences and generate clear reports. The test set becomes part of the digital testing environment.

This also shows why cooperation between IEC and IEEE experts is so important. Protection experts, communication experts, test-equipment experts and standardization experts must understand each other. IEC 61850 alone does not define how a protection function shall perform. IEC 60255 alone does not define the full communication system. IEEE P3416 alone does not define the protection algorithms. But together, these activities help users, manufacturers and test-equipment suppliers to build systems that can really interoperate.

Andrea often says that if experts do not interoperate, power systems will not interoperate either. This is exactly the point here ... and everywhere.

IEEE P3416 may look like a guide about relay test sets. But from the IEC 61850 point of view, it is more than that. It is part of the transition from conventional protection testing to digital protection testing. It connects test equipment with protection-function requirements, IEC 61850 communication, Sampled Values, GOOSE, time synchronization, test automation, reporting and calibration.

This is why I think IEEE P3416 is a project worth following closely — also for the IEC 61850 community.

Enjoy IEC 61850!

What is the Scope of the IEC 61850 Series?

The seven IEC 61850 CDVs published the other day (7-4, 7-4n and 7-4nn) use all the same Scope which starts:

Excerpt from:

Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 7-4: Basic communication structure – Compatible logical node classes and data object classes – Core

-------------

1.1 General

This part of IEC 61850 specifies the information model of devices and functions generally related to common use regarding applications in systems for power utility automation. In particular, it specifies the compatible logical node names and data object names for communication between intelligent electronic devices (IED). This includes the relationship between logical nodes and data objects.

...

This standard and its direct counterparts (7-4, 7-4n and 7-4nn) are applicable to describe device

models and functions for:

• substation and feeder equipment,
• substation-to-substation information exchange,
• substation-to-control centre information exchange,
• power plant-to-control centre information exchange,
• information exchange for distributed generation,
• information exchange for distributed energy resources,
• information exchange for metering,
• information exchanged for hydro power plants, or
• information exchange for wind generation plants.

--------------

The main title of all parts of the series IEC 61850 is: 

Communication networks and systems for power utility automation 

This title is some how an indication of the scope.

IEC 61850 can be used everywhere as follows:

Communication networks and systems for power utility automation

The narrow scope to power utilities is sometimes used by people that do not like the IEC 61850 series ... or do not want to let people outside the power utilities to apply it ... 

But the crucial content of the many different parts is applicable in most automation domains ... where ever electric power is found - buildings, factories, ... 

A lot of Logical Nodes, e.g., STMP (Supervision of Temperatures) are useful for transformers, bearings, tanks, ... 

Lessons learned:

1. The various parts of IEC 61850 are applicable far beyond of the written scope - if you like it or not.
2. Often the discussion related to the scope is aimed to tell you, that IEC 61850 is not applicable outside power utilities (or substations) - trust me: it is applicable far beyond.

By the way, the discussion of scopes could be ridiculous: IEC 60870-5-104  defines:

"This part of IEC 60870 applies to telecontrol equipment and systems with coded bit serial data transmission for monitoring and controlling geographically widespread processes. It defines a telecontrol companion standard that enables interoperability among compatible telecontrol equipment"

IEC 60870-5-104 does not have substation automation (usually not a widespread area) in its scope - BUT, you know 104 is used as the communication inside many substations! Ok ... why not. But then also IEC 61850 can be used for telecontrol ... see IEC 61850-80-1, ...
In the wind power industry it was discussed some 20 years ago: IEC 61850 is not applicable for wind turbines, because wind turbines are not substations ... hahaha

Enjoy IEC 61850!

Seven IEC 61850 Model Documents Published for Public CDV Comments

Please note that seven IEC 61850-7-xxx model documents have been published for CDV comments on 2026-02-13. The following documents are available for public comments until 2026-04-10:

IEC 61850-7-4 ED3
Communication networks and systems for power utility
automation - Part 7-4: Basic communication structure -
Compatible logical node classes and data object classes -
Core

IEC 61850-7-40 ED1
... Common part

IEC 61850-7-43 ED1
... Primary equipment

IEC 61850-7-44 ED1
... Instrument transformers

IEC 61850-7-400 ED1
.... Substation automation

IEC 61850-7-401 ED1
... Protection

IEC 61850-7-440 ED1
... Power quality metering

Enjoy!

IEC 61850 Is The Corner Stone Of Manageable Secure Power Systems

On September 16, 2025 I presented a Keynote Address at the 6th PS2 organized by Omicron.

Click HERE for accessing my slides [PDF, 9 MB] 

The crucial slide is on page 25:

The keynote discusses the challenge: Informatics versus electrical engineering. My understanding is that we need every expertise: concrete builder, electricians, metal ... copper ... electrical ... mechanical ... IT, OT, protection, automation, ... cyber security ... and so on. A holistic approach is needed.

Do not expect that one is the superior product ... or most crucial person ... 

Teamwork makes the dream work.

Check out how we could help.

IEC 61850 in Cyber Secure Environments - New Comprehensive Seminar

Due to my family situation (nursing my beloved wife from 2017 to 2022) I had to slow down my training activities. This year I was asked by several senior experts if it would be possible to resume the training.

As a result of discussions with friends of mine, we updated our previous course program and offer a brand new 5-day comprehensive public seminar for Automation, Protection, Monitoring, Engineering, Configuration (SCL), SCADA, Smart Grids, RTU, Gateways, … cyber physical security in electrical systems of any industrial plant … it is available for you and your people.

The reason for the update: We want to do more than teaching the theory of IEC 6850 and demonstrate single IEDs … we want to let our practice talk for your practice. The new training will start in March 2026. Taking the experience with many crucial applications of IEC 61850 into account we offer a new program for a 5-day course conducted by four (4) real experts.

09.-13. March 2026, Karlsruhe (Germany)
21.-25. September 2026, Karlsruhe (Germany)

Click HERE for more details on dates, location, and registration information.

IEC 61850 - What does Free allocation of the Logical Nodes mean?

Often people ask the question: Where should I allocate a specific function (and the corresponding Logical Node) in the hierarchy of: process, bay, substation, regional control center, central control center? 

In the following you will find some description from the Standard IEC 61850-5, a paper from 2001, a question I received the other day, my own brief answer to that question, and two answers from two good friends: Andrea Bonetti (Megger) and Joachim Lange (Solvay).

IEC 61850-5 (Communication requirements for functions and device models; Ed 2022) describes that the allocation is free to allow different architectures and levels were a function (respective a corresponding LN) can be allocated (means implemented).

Excerpt of Clause 9.2.1 Free allocation of Logical Nodes

"The free (arbitrary) allocation of functions or Logical Nodes respectively is not restricted to the common level structure."

The following excerpt of clause 10.1 Need for a formal system description is one of the crucial clauses in the whole standard series IEC 61850:

"Where the data is coming from (sending Logical Node) and is going to (receiving Logical Node), i.e. the static structure of the communication system, has to be engineered or negotiated during the set-up phase of the system. All functions in the IEDs have to know what data to send when and what data they need from functions in other IEDs to be able to fulfill their functions. To control the free allocation of functions respectively Logical Nodes and to create interoperable systems, a strong formal device and system description for communication engineering shall be provided. Such a description (System Configuration description Language) is defined in Part 6 of this standard (IEC 61850-6). This formal description shall also support the data exchange between different tools if applicable."

Be aware that the Logical Nodes are to be understood as a wrapper around a function. In most cases the function as such is behind the facade of the Logical Node. One exception is the Logical Node class FSCH (Schedule). The definition of FSCH contains a well defined state machine that is part of the function of a scheduler.

An old paper from the year 2001 may help you to understand the approach of IEC 61850

The Impact of the coming Standard IEC61850 on the Life-cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations

By Lars Andersson, Klaus-Peter Brand, Wolfgang Wimmer; ABB Power Automation Ltd., Switzerland

Excerpt from the paper:

1. Free allocation of functions [KHS: and therefore free allocation of Logical Nodes]
2. Extension rules to support new functionality
3. Separation of communication from application issues in a well defined manner
4. Description of the station from the application communication point of view.

Click HERE for the paper published in the year 2001.

Question:

Hi Karlheinz,
I’m a system engineer with a question on IEC 61850 in substation automation.
In a ring with all IEDs and two RTUs, are the RTUs only SCADA gateways, or can they also host SAS control logic (e.g., with a T500’s basic logic capability)?
Should a SAS operate autonomously from SCADA or higher-level PLCs, and if so, should the IEC 61850 RTUs implement control logic for outage restoration, load shedding, etc., to ensure autonomy?

Answer from Karlheinz Schwarz

Dear xx,
Thanks for contacting me.
IEC 61850 is independent from centralized or decentralized approach. It depends on the philosophy of the utility how to architect the system. Functions could be in the multi-functional IED (Relay), bay controller, substation controller, SCADA, control center, ...
IEC 61850 may be used to run schedules in control IED right behind the electrical connecting point of a home, factory, ... using the LN FSCH - Scheduling.
In Germany we have the so-called FNN Steuerbox that uses schedules for limiting the power usage ...
Hope that helps.

Answer from Andrea Bonetti

IEC 61850 does not prescribe where control logic must be located (read it as the famous sentence "free allocation of the Logical Nodes").
The decision is up to the system designer and the utility’s operational requirements. If autonomy of the HV ring is desired, logic may be placed in RTUs, bay controllers, or other IEDs so that the system operates without SCADA. Any such requirement would come from utility or regulatory specifications, not from the IEC 61850 standard.

There is no IEC 61850 requirement that mandates where control logic must be located — whether in RTUs, IEDs, or higher-level systems.
IEC 61850 specifies how devices exchange information and how to engineer all of that (SCL engineering), not where the logic resides.
Whether the HV ring is autonomous is purely a system design choice defined by the utility’s operational philosophy, national regulations, or internal standards — not by IEC 61850 itself.
If autonomy is required (e.g., for outage restoration or load shedding without SCADA), the designer can choose to implement logic in RTUs, bay controllers, or other IEDs so they can function without higher-level supervision.
Obviously it depends also on the voltage level. Usually, higher voltage level –> less integration. Lower voltage level à more integration.
But there are exceptions to this rule like always.

Answer from Joachim Lange

In case of classical terminals, neither the terminal number nor the terminal function is defined in any standard. Personally, in case of CFC implication I use UDx baycontrol blocks, defining „my signals“ and a group with the  "GOOSE exchange" signals
- in case of blocking signals like in double busbar structures I do this as well, because I use busbar selective reverse blocking in dependance of position information,
- this means that disconnector positions enables/disables the blocking transmission to its circuit breaker protection.
It is even useful to avoid that a send out blocking signals triggers during test a not involved feeder.
Some grid companies use f.e. blocking signal in combination with breaker failure. This means when signal is not reset in time they trigger the breaker failure protection.
So the CFC function is really case wise.
We have in our house in the UD1 group all signals which are used for bay supervision.
Philosophy: I decentralise load shedding and automation functions into the bay control level ( discrete frequency / voltage levels with hysteresis).
Such bay controller measures autonomously its conditions.
I provide from above (Scada) the enabling/ disabling signals or mode selections ( power level ) or setpoint correction signals.
The advantage is that a single device failure may not impact a hole system.

Note that Andrea Bonetti (Megger), Joachim Lange (Solvay), Dr. Ghada Elbez (KIT), and I will conduct a comprehensive training starting 09.-13. March 2026 Karlsruhe (Germany) and 21.-25. September 2026 Karlsruhe (Germany).
We will provide the details in the next weeks. Stay tuned.

Here are the logos for that training:

6th Power Systems Protection Summit (PS2) coming soon

Dissemination of information about IEC 61850 is crucial. One opportunity to listen to an online (virtual) conference is the Middle East 

6th Power Systems Protection Summit (PS2)
September 15–16, 2025

Click HERE for program information.

On day 2 I will give a keynote speech:

Keynote session - IEC 61850 is the Corner Stone of manageable Secure Power Systems
11:00AM - 11:20AM

IEC 61850 has come a long way since mid-1990.  A wide range of applications built with IEC 61850 will act as a game changer for traditional protection, automation, and SCADA products and systems. It aims to provide all parties involved with as much standardized information as possible for power systems. 

I look forward to meeting you virtually.

IEC 61850 Has Come A Long Way Since February 1995 - 30 Years

The development of an IEC Standard on "Substation Control and Protection Interfaces" (which is now IEC 61850) was discussed during the IEC TC 57 meeting in Sydney (November 1993). The Ad-hoc group „Substation Control and Protection Interfaces“ (led by Dr. Reiner Speh, Germany) was tasked to come up with a proposal. The result was published as:

IEC 57/214/INF Report of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Substation Control and Protection Interfaces, February 1995

This report covers the work of the Ad-Hoc Working Group from March 1994 to April 1995. The group was formed in November 1993 and consisted of 24 members from 12 countries. Four meetings where held in the time period and the results of the work provided the bases for forming Working groups 10, 11, and 12. 

Sources: TR 61850-1 (2003) and etz-Report 34  (Offene Kommunikation nach IEC 61850)

Three new work proposals (NP) have been proposed in February 1995 (57/210, 57/211, and 57/212). The acceptance of these NPs led to the new TC 57 working groups WG 10, WG 11, and WG 12 ...

The IEC 61850 standardization started 30 years ago - congratulation! I am involved since the very beginning in 1995!

What happend in the global market? A lot of discussions, complaints, ideas, benefits, success stories, ... ignorance, ... misinterpretations, disconnects, ... until today.

BUT wait: I guess the series IEC 61850 is accepted, planned and decided to be used, or already in use in many applications globally. It is interesting to check this blog what I have reported many years ago:

Wednesday, August 27, 2008 / Siemens sold more than 1000 plants with IEC 61850
Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / IEC 61850 Devices installed worldwide by Siemens: 300.000 (the incorporated links to Siemens websites are not working anymore)

There is no need in the year 2025 to count the number of IEDs or systems that implement IEC 61850 ... I just came about an interesting video published by CONDIS Group (Webinar on IEC 61850 Standardisation) the other day. Additional information ... on how many substations at Tennet (TSO in the Netherlands) will be refurbished with IEC 61850 ...

One reason why this all happens is here: my personal involvement ... and training all over ... as you may know: I am one of the great grandfathers of the standard series IEC 61850 and IEC 61400-25. 

By the way, I am a great grandfather in the real life as well! ... and a gray hair engineer ...

Any question?

My Friend Andrea Bonetti Has Been Appointed As New Chair of IEC TC 95 (Protection ...)

Please note that my friend Andrea Bonetti (currently working for Megger, Sweden) has been appointed as the new chair of IEC TC 95 (Measuring relays and protection equipment).

Andrea and I have conducted many training courses on IEC 61850 ... and cooperated in consulting services related to protection, communication, IEC 61850, ...

Congratulation!

I wish Andrea the best for his future ... managing the process of how power systems are protected. It is a huge task!!

Some Hints On Static And Dynamic Reporting According To IEC 61850

Let me briefly help to understand the term dynamic and static regarding reporting:

Every report control block must be “created” in an SCL file – no way to create a report control block with a service.

Several report control block attributes can be configured in an SCL file or set (overwritten) by a (MMS) service.

A data set can be “created” in an SCL file or by the optional service CreateDataSet.

The term “dynamic” could apply to the setting/overwriting of report control block attributes, and the creation of data sets.

In one case with a Gateway from a well known vendor (as a client) I have seen that the client always defines the data sets dynamically!! And links a given report control block to that created data set. If a server does not support the service CreateDataSet, then you get into trouble …

A nice summary can be found here:

https://wiki.lfenergy.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56380504

For operational functions (protection, control, …) the only dynamical services that should be allowed are to enable or disable the report control blocks. This should be configured in the corresponding SCL file for an IED by setting the attributes to “Conf”:

<ReportSettings cbName="Conf" datSet="Conf" rptID="Conf" optFields="Conf" bufTime="Conf" trgOps="Conf" intgPd="Conf" resvTms="true" owner="true" />

Example of a device from a well known vendor I received the other day:

<ReportSettings cbName="Conf" datSet="Dyn" rptID="Dyn" optFields="Dyn" bufTime="Dyn" trgOps="Dyn" intgPd="Dyn" resvTms="true" owner="true" />

Dynamic setting or overwriting of control block attributes or creation of a data set by a service could cause a lot of troubles!! Client and server should not allow it!  A well known RTU (client) overwrites dynamically a report control block attribute (in the server) immediately after it has connected to the server … that should not be accepted.

It could have a big impact on testing, e.g., you expect that a report (or GOOSE, SMV) message has a structure defined by a data set “X with 5 members” (according to the SCL file) … but you receive a message with 3 members (from data set Y) only … because somebody has overwritten the attribute “DatSet” of the report (GOOSE, SMV) control block. 

IEC 61850 is very flexible … to cause trouble … if you want to trust, that the device is 100% as shown in the SCL file, then NO dynamic modifications should be allowed!

Do you want have a problem - no problem!

By the way, Andrea Bonetti wrote the other day: "It is a good practice followed by the majority of the TSOs that do write their own IEC 61850 specification (sort of “dynamic reports are not allowed unless for testing/debugging”). It is also mentioned in IEC TS 63266:2023 (Representation of communication in power utility automation)."

International Conference on Substation Equipment in Lyon (F); 22.-24. Nov 2023

Please note that the 7th European Conference on Substation Equipment (Matpost 2023) with the focus on 

Major infrastructure projects for a carbon-free world and their impact on Substation equipment 

will welcome you in Lyon (France) next week: 22.-24. November 2023.

Click HERE for the program.

There is also a paper presentation on IEC 61850 ... check the program.

Siemens SIPROTEC 5 Relays With Various CPU Variants Have Security Issues

Please note the following information made public by US-Cert_CISA ... in case you use SIPROTEC 5 Relays:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CVSS v3 9.8

ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity

Vendor: Siemens

Equipment: SIPROTEC 5 relays

Vulnerabilities: Classic Buffer Overflow

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition or trigger a remote code execution.

Click HERE for the complete just updated report.

Power Outage In Frankfurt Area (Germany) - And People That Need A Breathing Ventilator

I just read that in the western part of the city Frankfurt (Main, Germany) the electric power was down for more than 10,000 customers. A current transformer (CT, for measuring the current) blow up ... and produced a lot of smoke. The power went off from 17:15 on Tuesday 2021-10-26. The restoration took some eight hours!

The Hessenschau (de) reported that nine (9!) people that depend on breathing ventilators had been hospitalized. This critical situation tells us, that the ventilators did likely not have battery backup power - either in the devices or external. The devices we use for my wife have both two internal batteries which give (rated!) power for 16 hours for each device.

This brings two questions up in my mind:

1. Why is it not required by law that all breathing ventilators have battery power for at least 24 hours?
2. Why don't we have to have external batteries and inverters that would give power for several days?

Instead of bringing patients with the ambulances to the hospital, it would be much easier (faster and cheaper) to bring an emergency power supply package (batterie plus inverter) to the patients! Or?

There seems to be a wide area of improving the quality of life.

By the way, why did the CT (current transformer) crash? Was it too old or not ... or? I hope that my friend Andrea Bonetti (one of the most experienced protection engineers on this planet) will comment on the importance of CTs!

Any comment?

Add on (2021-10-30): 

First: The utility has told that more than 100 workers are involved in fixing the problem ... the current fix is provisionary only! 100+ workers means: It must be a big problem that needs so many people to fix. 

Second: It was reported that in an elderly care home the nurses had to use their mobile phone's flash light to look for the elderly people ... no emergency light! Hmm ... strange. A few 12V batteries and some 12V LEDs would have done a good job! Cheap and useful ... lifesaving! ... if somebody would care for their maintenance. The management has obviously decided to purchase a hand lamp per floor ... 👍 something is better than nothing. Note: A battery leak (AA or AAA batteries) may damage a flash light that is not used often ... or only in case of emergency. Non leaking batteries are available: Lithium Batteries are the right choice for emergency devices. I have replaced the typical AA and AAA batteries with Lithium batteries for all flashlights and outdoor devices like thermometer ... they withstand cold weather and do not leak ... life time likely 10+ years ...

Click HERE for the extended Hessenschau (de) report.

IEC 61850 For Electrical Testing

Megger AB, Stockholm, Sweden is using IEC 61850 for various reasons in the electrical testing domain.

Andrea Bonetti is senior specialist in relay protection and IEC 61850 applications at Megger. Andrea has written a very interesting article in the latest issue of Electrical Tester magazine of Megger:

The importance of IEC 61850 in relation to the smart grid

He concludes: "Economic electricity supply: We need to study and get used to IEC 61850 methods, but once this is done, the economic advantage is evident: reusability of previous projects, shared understanding, focus of the technical community on solving common problems, and concentration of the resources.

In conclusion, I hope it is now clear that IEC 61850 is not just a communication protocol but a complete philosophy for electrical systems. So, next time you have a smart grid project, please try to answer this question: How much of IEC 61850 am I using in my project?"

Click HERE to download the latest issue of the Magazine (101 MB) or click HERE to view the magazine online.

The abbreviation "IEC 61850" could be found 100 times throughout the magazine! ... in conjunction with testing, smart grid, ...

Enjoy!

Sampled Values and IEC 61850-9-2 LE: What is it?

The other day I received the following email:

Dear Mr. Karlheinz Schwarz,
I am sorry to disturb you. My name is XXX and I am a researcher from YYY. I would like to ask some questions to you regarding the standard IEC 61850-9-2LE.

1) May I know the status of IEC 61850-9-2LE? Is the standard will be obsolete or remain as it this?

2) Can I get some explanations from you about the differences between IEC 61850-9-2, IEC 61850-9-2LE and IEC 61869-9?

I really appreciate your kindness and time to answer my questions above.
Thank you & best regards,

-------------------------------

I have a very good friend that I asked to answer for me. Her is his answer:

Dear Karlheinz, 

Sure I can do my best for that.

Thanks for this opportunity.

Dear XXX, please see my attempt to answer.

Your questions are our everyday’s questions, and my answers need to be taken with “common sense”, reasonability and not as law, where somebody is right and somebody is wrong.

This is the best I can say.

The IEC 61850-9-2 Light Edition (LE)  is NOT a standard.  It is an UCA profile; a sort of gentlemen agreement (followed by everybody so far), where in principle the dataset carried by the SV Message (Sampled Values message) is fixed to 4 voltages and 4 currents.

The sampling frequency is 80 samples per period (4000 Hz for 50 Hz systems and 4800 Hz for 60 Hz systems).

The length of the SV message is fixed (in terms of bytes)

The quality string has one “extra bit” (the 14th bit, for derived or measured of the analog quantity) compared with a “normal quality string” of IEC 61850 and also IEC 61869 series, of 13 bits.

The time synchronization is 1-PPS

There is formally no support for PTP time synch (typical of “Edition 2” of IEC 61850 standard. LE is “edition 1”)

There is formally no support for “SIMULATION” mechanism (typical od “Edition 2 “ of IEC 61850 standard; LE is “edition 1”)

And many others.

TO MY EXPERIENCE:

It is commonly understood (and you have to make sure it is commonly understood also by the people working in your projects: suppliers, consultants, utility engineers etc) that:

- 9-2 LE supports Simulation mechanisms

- 9-2 LE supports PTP as time synch (be careful that PTP is actually IEC 61850-9-3: 2016 )

Even if formally this is not strictly in line with the UCA specification for “LE”.

So, IEC 61850-9-2LE (written by UCA working group) is a profile of IEC 61850-9-2 (written by the IEC committee TC 57)

And today it is the only “standard” that is implemented and in service for process bus applications.

IEC 61869-9 (and also -6 and also soon the -13) are parts of the IEC 61869 series, written by the IEC committee TC 38 (Instrument Transformer). 

So they have to do with the Merging Units, they are also profiles somehow, and also many other requirements, that you need to fulfill if you want to have a Merging Unit according to IEC standards.

To my opinion, no matter what IEC 61850 says in general, if you do a Merging Unit and follow IEC, you should follow IEC 61869 series.

In principle, the IEC 6185069-9 standards are often associated to:

• “Dynamic” dataset. This means that not only 4 U and 4 I will be transmitted. I can transmit just  one voltage, or 25 currents, or 6 voltages and 3 currents.. This is done from SCL.
• Sampling frequency of 4800 Hz, no matter the power system frequency (50 Hz or 60 Hz).
• PTP time synchronization (for MU)
• 2 samples per SV message (so called ASDU). “LE” has only one sample per message (one ASDU per message)

But it is of course much more than that.

What about protection relays/protection functions?

TC 95 is responsible for protection functions in IEC.

In principle it  is TC 95 / MT 4 (Maintenance Team 4) that takes care of functional standards for protection functions (IEC 60255-121:2014 for distance protection for example). Other maintenance teams take care of protection related standards like EMC etc.

Recently TC 95 has started a new working group (WG 2) that considers IEC 61850 for protection applications. A Technical Report is on its way and parts of that technical report will be implemented in the so called IEC 60255-1xx series, for protection relays.

But this is not ready yet and all of this needs to be considered with extreme care and communication among all the involved parts in a project.

I work as well as consultant for IEC 61850 applications in relay protection. Mainly for TSOs, since many years. Please have a look at this paper, written by many of us active in TC 95 / WG2. I think it will help you to better understand.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334050781_Standardisation_Challenges_for_Digital_Inputs_and_Outputs_of_Protection_Functions_in_IEC_60255_series

If you are interested in what TC 95 / WG2 does, you are more than welcome to contact me and I’ll help you in joining “our” activities.

For your understanding, there is a high dialog between TC 95, TC 38 and TC 17 (circuit breakers) for making the use of IEC 61850 more interoperable not only at “data level” but also at “functional level”, at least for protection applications.

For metering or power quality applications, for example, I don’t know what to say.

I hope this helps you.

Karlheinz, your extra comments are always welcome.

My best regards

Andrea Bonetti

Just passed

 Fachtagung Schutz- und Leittechnik 2020 , Berlin, 18-19 February 2020

NEW FORMAT!  Megger Magazine: ELECTRICAL TESTER
White Paper - Testing ROCOF and IEC 60255-181 Standard

Article - IEC 61850 GOOSE interoperability
IEEE 2018- Paper on IEC 61850 substation maintenance
MATPOST 2019 Lyon FR – Paper on IEC 61850 and Automatic Fault Disturbance Analysis

First time in industry! long duration End to End testing without use of any computer!

Mr. Andrea Bonetti MSEE
Senior Application Specialist Relay Protection and IEC 61850
Active member of IEC TC 95 / MT 4 ”Measuring relays and protection equipment” since 2006.
Megger Sweden AB

andrea.bonetti@megger.com
Rinkebyvägen 19, SE-182 36 Danderyd (Stockholm)
Sweden

Megger Organizes the First Latin American Protection Conference 6-7 November

Primera edición del Congreso Latinoamericano de Protecciones

La primera edición del Congreso Latinoamericano de Protecciones (https://www.eventosmeggercsa.com) a desarrollarse los días 6 y 7 de noviembre del corriente año en el Hotel Meliá, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

El evento reúne a especialistas y líderes en la implementación de sistemas de protecciones orientado a la experiencia del usuario final. Se dirige a lograr un panorama sobre el estado actual y futuro de los sistemas de protecciones dentro de la subestación y en la red más amplia en América Latina.
El programa de dos días abarca ponencias de usuarios, fabricantes, especialistas y expertos, seguido del tutorial de dos horas de duración sobre los Factores de éxito para la utilización de IEC 61850 dirigido por el Ing. Carlos Samitier centrada en los estudios de caso de implementación de IEC 61850 a nivel global, los errores más frecuentes y cómo evitarlos. Además, de los paneles sobre futuras aplicaciones en mantenimiento en IEC 61850 con la participación de los especialistas en tecnologías de ensayo de protecciones.

Los ejes temáticos están relacionados con los Avances y tendencias en IEC 61850, Esquemas avanzados en protecciones, Ensayos automatizados de protecciones eléctricas, Lecciones aprendidas en activaciones de protecciones, Comunicaciones para protecciones, entre otros.

In case you are interest to share your experiences at the conference, contact Mr. Roberto Sartori (Roberto.Sartori@megger.com).

Cyber Security and SAFETY in Power Systems

The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at NIST just released a draft of the NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide, SP 1800-23, Energy Sector Asset Management, on September 23, 2019, and is requesting your feedback. Public comments on the draft will close on November 25, 2019. "...that will help energy organizations address the security challenges of OT asset management. ..."

The main objective is to have a look at "programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), which provide command and control information on operational technology (OT) networks ..."

Click HERE for the Guide.

The Guide seems to be written by mainly non-protection engineers or even non-electrical engineers. I have read the other day in a discussion about the Guide that the term SAFETY was not mentioned in the  guide ... huch ...

Here is my explanation why SAFETY is not in the scope:

The safety in electric power systems is mainly managed by PROTECTION devices. These devices protect humans, equipment and power flow. Protection has the highest priority in electric power systems. Protection is also crucial for availability and reliability. Protection engineers are - in my view - the most critical engineers.

My experience is that IT and OT people fear the high voltage ... starting at 100 Volt or so ... so, that may be the reason the document NIST SP 1800-23 does not discuss any protection (SAFETY) related function.

They don't have Sr. protection engineers in their mind ... maybe they don't know what these engineers are doing ... and how important they are to keep the power flowing.

A friend of mine (a senior protection engineer) and I have conducted many IEC 61850 seminars together ... I have always admired him!!

My friend answered:

In general unfortunately it is as you describe.
The circuit breaker doesn’t work? The protection engineers have invented the “breaker failure”. This is a bit biased, any component can fail of course…
The Sampled Values are not delivered? The relay has to manage that. They are “delivered wrong”? The relay has to try to understand it and be robust.
Yes, it is probably more difficult to design and set a good protection system (including the design of the relay) than doing an airplane...

IEC 61850 Sampled Values and GOOSE Messages Reduce Complexity and Cost

Synaptec Ltd (a spin-out technology company from the University of Strathclyde, UK) developed a distributed electrical sensing technology platform using IEC 61850. The approach allows measured values from up to 50 current transformers to be acquired passively using a single optical fibre core over a distance of up to 50 km. These measured values can then be utilised as part of centralised PAC schemes, or communicated to traditional PAC devices for analysis via IEC 61850-9-2 / 61869-9. By centralising current measurements, this method eliminates the need of having multiple protection relays at each line ends, complex time synchronisation systems at measurement points, and complex telecommunications equipment among the distributed PAC devices.

Click HERE for downloading the 12 page paper (Differential protection of multi-ended transmission circuits using passive distributed current sensors) describing the application and approach to solve a very crucial challenge.

Another paper (Implementation of centralised, numerical busbar protection using distributed photonic current sensors) describes the design and testing of the first centralised busbar protection scheme that makes use of distributed photonic current sensors and IEC 61850. By utilising distributed, passive sensors which are interrogated purely using standard optical fibre, the requirement for active units in the substation yard is completely eliminated. Additionally, the use of copper wiring from CTs to measurement units may be eliminated. The scheme, designed and built for Statnett by Synaptec, will be installed and trialled at Statnett’s Furuset R&D substation near Oslo, Norway. A prototype centralised busbar protection algorithm, validated with the University of Strathclyde, will run on the central merger unit to prove the principle of centralised busbar protection using a single active IED.

Click HERE for downloading the paper.

Click HERE for the Synaptec news (Norwegian TSO Statnett innovates with Synaptec technologies):

With one system able to instrument 50 locations synchronously, 6 busbar feeders will be independently and simultaneously protected by one system, with capacity to spare for novel temperature and vibration monitoring of nearby HV assets, such as transformers.

The development and the applications show that the standard series IEC 61850 has all the "tools" helping to keep the power flowing and the grass green - at all voltage levels.

IEC TC 57 Just Published Draft IEC 61850-90-20 On Redundancy

IEC TC 57 just published the first Draft IEC 61850-90-20 on System Redundancy:

57/2080A/DC
IEC TR 61850-90-20 ED1
Communication networks and systems for power utility automation –
Part 90-20: Guideline to redundancy systems

Excerpt from the Introduction:

"The paper “CIGRE B5-109: Redundancy challenges on IEC 61850 systems and Migration
Paths for IEC 61850 Substation Communication Networks” introduce redundancy concepts as
follows
“Device redundancy of substation control units may be required in order to increase the availability of the substation automation system at the station level. System level redundancy is achieved by hot-hot or hot-standby configuration of duplicated station units that need to exchange information to ensure data consistency as well as coordinated and safe operation.
IEC 61850 communications in redundant configuration of duplicated clients faces challenges how to ensure that database in both central station control units are synchronized and that no events are lost during the switchover from the primary to secondary IEC 61850 client.”
A proposed redundancy system consists of two IED entities forming a logic IED. One or more lower level IEDs, e.g. merging units or circuit breaker, delivering the input data for the IED entities and getting results from the IED entities. One or more higher level clients receives output data from the IED entities for supervision or HMI.
Additionally, a higher level IED might exist, which supervises the state of the redundant system. In this context this concerns especially the state of the IED entities, so that a failed IED can be detected and repaired before the second IED fails.
The communication between the redundant system application and the lower level IEDs takes place with IEC 61850, mainly based on IEC 61850-8-1(MMS) reporting and commands, for time critical functions with IEC 61850-8-1(GOOSE) and IEC 61850-9-2(SV).
The communication to station level clients based on IEC 61850 is typically MMS based for supervision, commands and settings configuration changes. Since MMS is acknowledged service, server and client are aware of each other and the client supervises the servers. If both redundant system IEDs are hot, the client might select which of them it takes for executing a service request."

The TC57 P-members are invited to submit comments to this draft by 2019-03-29 at the latest.

Please note:
The application domains that need redundant systems may be crucial (for some high voltage systems) but may not be applicable for most systems in the energy delivery domain. This document is really of interest for a small, special group of experts ... not everybody interested in using IEC 61850 for exchanging some signals may need to check that draft document.
One challenge with IEC 61850 is: Which subset out of a big standard series do I need to understand for my application - that means: YOU HAVE TO KNOW YOUR APPLICATION !!

Omicron offers new ways for IEC 61850 Substation Automation System testing

Testing the automation, control, and SCADA communication in IEC 61850 Substation Automation System (SAS) is as time consuming as testing the protection – or often even more.

StationScout simplifies the testing and reduces the required effort significantly.

With its powerful functions, StationScout is a specialist for the whole lifecycle of a SAS – from engineering to continuous maintenance. The clear status overview provides ideal support for commissioning and maintenance engineers during the different tasks in Substation Automation Systems utilizing IEC 61850.

Key features:

Status overview: StationScout provides a clear overview of the substation, visualizing the communication according to IEC 61850 in SCL files, values and states in the substation.

Signal tracing: The communication diagram of StationScout allows for signal tracing, from the overview down to the detailed communication message attributes.

Automated testing: StationScout is able to re-use predefined test plans for an automated testing procedure.

Cyber security: The dedicated hardware of StationScout ensures cyber secure operation within the substation communication network.

Simulation: The powerful simulation features of StationScout simplify testing and commissioning. Missing IEDs and IOs can also be simulated.

Defining own names: IEC 61850 abbreviations are quite cryptic. Defining of own names in StationScout allows for comfortable asset handling.

Click HERE for detailed information about the StationScout (English)
Click HERE for detailed information about the StationScout (German)