On September 16, 2025 I presented a Keynote Address at the 6th PS2 organized by Omicron.
Click HERE for accessing my slides [PDF, 9 MB]
IEC 61850, IEC 61400-25, IEC 61970 (CIM), IEC 60870-5, DNP3, IEC 62351 (Security), ...
On September 16, 2025 I presented a Keynote Address at the 6th PS2 organized by Omicron.
Click HERE for accessing my slides [PDF, 9 MB]
A model is a model is a model ... huch.
The question is: What does a model provide? In short: It provides an external visible PATH to an actual value of something, e.g., a voltage or temperature. A model of my home is not something where I can life in! It shows where the rooms, stairs, ... are ...
The leaves (or end points) of the model in the IEC 61850 TREE (of a model) are NOT where the actual value reside! Basic Data Attribute (BDA) in IEC 61850 are the leaves of the trees.
Just a minor comment on the BDA: I found this: "This is the lowest level, where the actual value resides." IEC 61850 defines models that hide the storage location of an actual value. The BDA is a PATH to the actual value. The value resides "behind" that model. The BDA holds an externally non-visible or non-accessible reference to the actual measurement value or status.
When reading the current value of the phase A of the MODEL MMXU1 you send a read request with the PATH: "LD/MMXU1.A.phsA.cVal.mag.f". This PATH is translated into the direct or indirect storage location of a specific IED. How that is implemented, depends on the architecture of the interface and application software. It may even be mapped to an underlying fieldbus specific address (e.g., Modbus coil 2828). When the read request is received, the IED uses Modbus to read the actual value from coil 2828. In this case the actual value resides beyond the IED with its MODEL. The IED needs a non-visible specific mapping from the PATH to the Modbus register.
The models in IEC 61850 describe a virtual world in the following sense:
I hope that helps to understand the Models in IEC 61850.
This virtualization has an impact on how an IEC 61850 Stack (is not defined in IEC 61850 what a stack is) you purchase maps the leaves of the model to the location of your actual values.
Please note the following preferences ... and have fun:
Version I used today:
Set the mms filter so see mms/IEC61850 only:
In case the MMS server is using a different port number: e.g., 12001 instead of standard port 102:
Analyze/Decode/ set other port number accordingly:
Check if presentation users context is correct:
Analyzing MMS/ASN.1/BER is sometimes tricky ... here is an example I figured out the other day ... if the length of a value is three (3) octets then the ASN.1 BER encoded message should indicate a length of 3 ... not 2 ... one single error in the length could damage the communication ...
The famous UCA International Users Group invites you to attend a very interesting Webinar conducted by René Troost (Grid Strategist) at Stedin (Netherlands):
“The Dutch IEC 61850 DSO-DER Realtime Interface: Practical Insights and Experiences”
René serves as a Grid Strategist at Stedin, a major Distribution System Operator (DSO) in the Netherlands. In addition to his role at Stedin, he actively participates in and leads nationwide projects.
Date: 2 October 2025
16:00 - 17:00 MESZ
The webinar is free to attend and open to everyone!
Click HERE to register.
Excerpt: Real-time interface: deepening
"Since October 2020, grid operators and market participants have been working together on a Real-Time Interface (RTI). The goal of this interface is to enable generators and grid operators to collaborate on increasing and better utilizing transmission capacity and maintaining the electricity grid safely. The RTI specification was published in February 2024."
IEC 61850 Protocol Implementation Document (PID)
Excerpt: "IEC 61850 Real Time Interface (RTI), as defined by the Dutch System Operators specifies the implementation profile of the IEC 61850 Real Time Interface (RTI), as defined by the Dutch System Operators."
30 years after the start of the standardization work for IEC 61850 it is obvious that IEC 61850 is THE standard series when it comes to the exchange of real-time information between power generation sites and control centers of DSOs.
Due to my family situation (nursing my beloved wife from 2017 to 2022) I had to slow down my training activities. This year I was asked by several senior experts if it would be possible to resume the training.
As a result of discussions with friends of mine, we updated our previous course program and offer a brand new 5-day comprehensive public seminar for Automation, Protection, Monitoring, Engineering, Configuration (SCL), SCADA, Smart Grids, RTU, Gateways, … cyber physical security in electrical systems of any industrial plant … it is available for you and your people.
The reason for the update: We want to do more than teaching the theory of IEC 6850 and demonstrate single IEDs … we want to let our practice talk for your practice. The new training will start in March 2026. Taking the experience with many crucial applications of IEC 61850 into account we offer a new program for a 5-day course conducted by four (4) real experts.
09.-13. March 2026, Karlsruhe (Germany)
21.-25. September 2026, Karlsruhe (Germany)
Click HERE for more details on dates, location, and registration information.
I have posted news about the Italian norm CEI 0-16 in 2013 (12 years ago) regarding the use of IEC 61850 for DSO - Distribution System Operators:
Click HERE to see the three old posts.
During the last years I have not seen a lot of discussions regarding Italian DSOs ... maybe I just did not look for it.
By some request today, I searched the internet to see what happened: A LOT ... I guess.
Several up-to-date documents are downloadable for free:
Standards CEI 0-16 and CEI 0-21, TR 57-126 e PAS 57-127
Click HERE for accessing the documents.
One of the key documents is likely: Reference technical rules for the connection of active and passive consumers to the HV and MV electrical networks of distribution Company
<<Standard CEI 0-16 – Versione consolidata di lavoro>>
The document <<Standard CEI TR 57-126>> contains even a SCL File for the IED to be used (guess it is an example; from 2022).
I guess these specifications (for FREE) cover more applications (generation and load) compared to the German FNN Steuerbox (load only; spec for 39 Euro).
Needs further investigation to understand the similarities and differences. Anyway, both use IEC 61850!
After yesterdays post (2025-08-27), I found today (2025-08-28) a nice description of one of the backgrounds for CEI 0-16:
Enabling of frequency control on distributed generation by CEI 0-16 Power Plant Controller: an analysis of the benefits on system’s stability
Click HERE for the 190 page paper ... very helpful
Often people ask the question: Where should I allocate a specific function (and the corresponding Logical Node) in the hierarchy of: process, bay, substation, regional control center, central control center?
In the following you will find some description from the Standard IEC 61850-5, a paper from 2001, a question I received the other day, my own brief answer to that question, and two answers from two good friends: Andrea Bonetti (Megger) and Joachim Lange (Solvay).
IEC 61850-5 (Communication requirements for functions and device models; Ed 2022) describes that the allocation is free to allow different architectures and levels were a function (respective a corresponding LN) can be allocated (means implemented).
Excerpt of Clause 9.2.1 Free allocation of Logical Nodes
"The free (arbitrary) allocation of functions or Logical Nodes respectively is not restricted to the common level structure."
The following excerpt of clause 10.1 Need for a formal system description is one of the crucial clauses in the whole standard series IEC 61850:
"Where the data is coming from (sending Logical Node) and is going to (receiving Logical Node), i.e. the static structure of the communication system, has to be engineered or negotiated during the set-up phase of the system. All functions in the IEDs have to know what data to send when and what data they need from functions in other IEDs to be able to fulfill their functions. To control the free allocation of functions respectively Logical Nodes and to create interoperable systems, a strong formal device and system description for communication engineering shall be provided. Such a description (System Configuration description Language) is defined in Part 6 of this standard (IEC 61850-6). This formal description shall also support the data exchange between different tools if applicable."
Be aware that the Logical Nodes are to be understood as a wrapper around a function. In most cases the function as such is behind the facade of the Logical Node. One exception is the Logical Node class FSCH (Schedule). The definition of FSCH contains a well defined state machine that is part of the function of a scheduler.
An old paper from the year 2001 may help you to understand the approach of IEC 61850
The Impact of the coming Standard IEC61850 on the Life-cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations
By Lars Andersson, Klaus-Peter Brand, Wolfgang Wimmer; ABB Power Automation Ltd., Switzerland
Excerpt from the paper:
Click HERE for the paper published in the year 2001.
Question:
Hi Karlheinz,
I’m a system engineer with a question on IEC 61850 in substation automation.
In a ring with all IEDs and two RTUs, are the RTUs only SCADA gateways, or can they also host SAS control logic (e.g., with a T500’s basic logic capability)?
Should a SAS operate autonomously from SCADA or higher-level PLCs, and if so, should the IEC 61850 RTUs implement control logic for outage restoration, load shedding, etc., to ensure autonomy?
Answer from Karlheinz Schwarz
Dear xx,
Thanks for contacting me.
IEC 61850 is independent from centralized or decentralized approach. It depends on the philosophy of the utility how to architect the system. Functions could be in the multi-functional IED (Relay), bay controller, substation controller, SCADA, control center, ...
IEC 61850 may be used to run schedules in control IED right behind the electrical connecting point of a home, factory, ... using the LN FSCH - Scheduling.
In Germany we have the so-called FNN Steuerbox that uses schedules for limiting the power usage ...
Hope that helps.
Answer from Andrea Bonetti
IEC 61850 does not prescribe where control logic must be located (read it as the famous sentence "free allocation of the Logical Nodes").
The decision is up to the system designer and the utility’s operational requirements. If autonomy of the HV ring is desired, logic may be placed in RTUs, bay controllers, or other IEDs so that the system operates without SCADA. Any such requirement would come from utility or regulatory specifications, not from the IEC 61850 standard.
There is no IEC 61850 requirement that mandates where control logic must be located — whether in RTUs, IEDs, or higher-level systems.
IEC 61850 specifies how devices exchange information and how to engineer all of that (SCL engineering), not where the logic resides.
Whether the HV ring is autonomous is purely a system design choice defined by the utility’s operational philosophy, national regulations, or internal standards — not by IEC 61850 itself.
If autonomy is required (e.g., for outage restoration or load shedding without SCADA), the designer can choose to implement logic in RTUs, bay controllers, or other IEDs so they can function without higher-level supervision.
Obviously it depends also on the voltage level. Usually, higher voltage level –> less integration. Lower voltage level à more integration.
But there are exceptions to this rule like always.
Answer from Joachim Lange
In case of classical terminals, neither the terminal number nor the terminal function is defined in any standard. Personally, in case of CFC implication I use UDx baycontrol blocks, defining „my signals“ and a group with the "GOOSE exchange" signals
- in case of blocking signals like in double busbar structures I do this as well, because I use busbar selective reverse blocking in dependance of position information,
- this means that disconnector positions enables/disables the blocking transmission to its circuit breaker protection.
It is even useful to avoid that a send out blocking signals triggers during test a not involved feeder.
Some grid companies use f.e. blocking signal in combination with breaker failure. This means when signal is not reset in time they trigger the breaker failure protection.
So the CFC function is really case wise.
We have in our house in the UD1 group all signals which are used for bay supervision.
Philosophy: I decentralise load shedding and automation functions into the bay control level ( discrete frequency / voltage levels with hysteresis).
Such bay controller measures autonomously its conditions.
I provide from above (Scada) the enabling/ disabling signals or mode selections ( power level ) or setpoint correction signals.
The advantage is that a single device failure may not impact a hole system.
Note that Andrea Bonetti (Megger), Joachim Lange (Solvay), Dr. Ghada Elbez (KIT), and I will conduct a comprehensive training starting 09.-13. March 2026 Karlsruhe (Germany) and 21.-25. September 2026 Karlsruhe (Germany).
We will provide the details in the next weeks. Stay tuned.
Here are the logos for that training:
Dissemination of information about IEC 61850 is crucial. One opportunity to listen to an online (virtual) conference is the Middle East
6th Power Systems Protection Summit (PS2)
September 15–16, 2025
Click HERE for program information.
On day 2 I will give a keynote speech:
Keynote session - IEC 61850 is the Corner Stone of manageable Secure Power Systems
11:00AM - 11:20AM
IEC 61850 has come a long way since mid-1990. A wide range of applications built with IEC 61850 will act as a game changer for traditional protection, automation, and SCADA products and systems. It aims to provide all parties involved with as much standardized information as possible for power systems.
I look forward to meeting you virtually.
To helping you to understand the comprehensiveness of the standard series IEC 61850, I have composed some information as an overview of the 46 officially published and available documents (with a total of 7.361 pages) ...
Click HERE for the list [pdf 138 KB]
Mark your calendar (UPDATE):
- 09.-13. March 2026 in Karlsruhe/Germany
- 21.-25. September 2026 in Karlsruhe/Germany
Stay tuned to get details in the next weeks.
The officially published FNN Steuerbox specification (in German only) is available for immediate download (of a personalized pdf) ... if you pay 39 Euro ... really affordable!
The Steuerbox uses a subset of IEC 61850 models and services ... check it:
https://www.vde-verlag.de/buecher/636412/lastenheft-steuerbox.html
In the History element of the ICD file you can see that my granddaughter Jana and I have been involved ...
Enjoy
I have contributed to the MAP/MMS Standardization (Manufacturing Automation Protocols/Manufacturing Message Specification) from the very beginning. I was working for Siemens in the group dealing with communication solutions for process control and factory automation. In February 1985 I attended the first time a meeting of the MAP project at the GM TechCenter in Warren (Michigan, USA). As you can see, the first day was a very cold day (1985-02-14) with a lot of fresh snow:
I looked still young (40 years younger than today) ... 32 years old and father of four children.
The approach of MAP/MMS was very new ... even today a lot of people have difficulties with MMS ... especially because of using ASN.1 BER as the encoding notation for all messages exchanged according to IEC 61850 - Client/Server and Publisher/Subscriber messages!!
In 1993 I got also involved in the new IEC TC 57 project TASE.2 (Telecontrol Application Service Element 2) based on MMS ... called ICCP (Intercontrol Center Communication Protocol):
I attended the following meeting in Loveland (Colorado, USA):
30 years ago (March 1995) the IEC TC 57 decided to start a new project: IEC 61850 based on the EPRI UCA 2.0 Specification ... also using MMS/ASN.1/BER ... I got involved in UCA and IEC 61850 starting with the second IEC TC 57 WG 10 meeting end of 1995.
Many people in the electrical power world have complained since then that MMS/ASN.1/BER is toooo ... too much of ... and as a result many have departed from the approach.
I have suggested many times to use web services ... JSON encoding instead of ASN.1/BER and XML ... most people ignored the use of web services ... I guess it will come in the near future.
In many of the following standardization groups I have supported modern communication approaches ... in some cases it took some time ... or still is awaiting for a push:
One of the crucial aspects of the standard series IEC 61850 is about object modeling ... first versions have been published in the year 2004 ... guess you agree!
Did you know that object modeling for process automation was already defined to some degree in the late 1980s for the standard ISO/IEC 9506-6 (MMS Companion Standard for Process Control) - published in the year 1994? Maybe you are surprised ... you may even have been born after that time ...
The other day I have documented the following example of supervision of rate change of a process measurement:
On the bottom the MMS Named Variable C_PVRCPAP is shown. The semantic (setting for a specific event) is equivalent to the "Temperature rate alarm trigger level setting" of the LN class STMP in IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2.1. The definition in MMS part 6 is generic and applies to any measurement.
I would say that the MMS companion standard ISO/IEC 9506-6 was some 30 years too early published ... mainly due to the fact that many engineers did not understand abstract object modeling.
History repeats itself, which is good because most people don't pay attention the first time anyway.
And today? Hope you have a better understanding! In case you need help ... let me know.
The semantic of the huge amount of signals in IEC 61850 or the few in the old ISO/IEC 9506-6 make the difference compared to most protocols like IEC 60870-5-104 and ...
Please note that last Friday IEC TC 57 has published the following Committee Draft for Vote (CDV) (57/2750/CDV) for comments by National Committees AND for public commenting by anybody before April 04, 2025:
IEC 61850-7-410 ED3: Communication networks and systems for power utility automation - Part 7-410: Basic communication structure - Hydroelectric power plants - Communication for monitoring and control
To comment on the CDV please click HERE. If you have not yet an account you can register ... if you have an account, go on. (IEC reports: Please use Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge).
IEC Public Commenting is a chance to let your voice be heard before the final vote.
This draft is a major step forward to get an international standard for hydroelectric power plants, steam and gas turbines.
There are a lot of expectations regarding AI (Artificial Intelligence) ... what are experienced engineers telling us ...
I came about a very interesting post on LinkedIn from David Ingram. The post is worth reading!!
Click HERE for the post.
The comment from Chris Turner on the post writes:
"AI fails in poorly understood domains. It relies on websites that may be right, wrong or a mixture of both. e.g. I asked AI "Q: What In-Circuit Test measurements (including powered tests), are most likely to provide a Gaussian bell shaped curve?
A: .... "
Chris resumes: "The AI answer is wrong."
I am not surprised ...
EES (Backnang) bietet eine "super-einfache" Lösung zur Alarmierung von Störungen in IEC 61850 basierten Systemen:
"Neben den Informationen von Feld- und Schutzgeräten, fallen in Schaltanlagen zusätzliche Meldungen an, die an die Leittechnik übermittelt werden sollen. Diese Informationen sollen über die vorhandene Infrastruktur mit dem Protokoll IEC 61850 übertragen werden. ...
HIER kommen Sie zu weiteren Informationen.
Dieses Beispiel zeigt, dass IEC 61850 auch für einfache Aufgaben angewendet werden kann!
Are you expecting that every communication system has one or the other issue with security? You are right! What's about LTE and 5G? Here is what researchers have found:
Check out the following:
RANsacked: Over 100 Security Flaws Found in LTE and 5G Network Implementations
By Ravie Lakshmanan
Excerpt: "A group of academics has disclosed details of over 100 security vulnerabilities impacting LTE and 5G implementations that could be exploited by an attacker to disrupt access to service and even gain a foothold into the cellular core network. ..."
Click HERE and HERE for additional information.
LTE and 5G are used for power systems all over ... just google for iec 61850 lte 3g ... you will be surprised ;-)
Click HERE to follow some discussion on remote monitoring and control ... if ever possible minimize the use of communication ...