How to Migrate to Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)?

IEC TC 57 just published a new draft document for a future Technical Report:

IEC 62357-200 TR (57/1563/DTR):
Power systems management and associated information exchange –
Part 200: Guidelines for migration to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)

Application: Utility communications using utility-owned and leased networks, including, but not restricted to communication within substations, from substation to substation, from substation to control center / maintenance center, control center to control center, energy management systems, synchrophasors, distributed and bulk energy generation and storage resources and (including fossil fuel plants and renewables) wind-, and solar power generation, storage, demand side management, and demand response for distribution level consumers / producers.

This draft Technical Report addresses the issues encountered when migrating from Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). It describes migration strategies, covering impact on applications, communication stack, network elements, configuration, address allocation, cyber security, and the related management.

The migration will add new need and require more skills of the engineers. It is highly recommended to have some people that start learning the changes that will come during the next 30+ years.

Maybe you start with a small group as we did in the standardization process 15+ years ago in Seattle (WA) in 1999:

Teamwork makes the dream work!

Be aware that the “network infrastructure” becomes one of the most crucial basics for all other infrastructures.

Would your company’s communications infrastructure survive a blackout like the one in The Netherlands today (2015-03-27)?

“Dutch electricity network administrator Tennet says that a large part of North Holland province, which is home to some 2.7 million people, was hit by the outage.

Tennet said on its Twitter feed that the outage was caused by a “technical fault” a high-voltage power station in the town of Diemen, just outside Amsterdam.”

Source: The Independent

I hope it was not caused by an “unknown” GOOSE Trip Message! … Which – at least – would mean it was not related to TCP/IP … IPv4 or IPv6. I am kidding! … a bit.

Another Infrastructure: Are Traffic Lights Secure?

Several experts from the University of Michigan have analyzed the safety critical nature of traffic infrastructures. Their findings are summarized in a paper presented in August 2014:

“Green Lights Forever: Analyzing the Security of Traffic Infrastructure”

Abstract: “The safety critical nature of traffic infrastructure requires that it be secure against computer-based attacks, but this is not always the case. We investigate a networked traffic signal system currently deployed in the United States
and discover a number of security flaws that exist due to systemic failures by the designers. We leverage these flaws to create attacks which gain control of the system, and we successfully demonstrate them on the deployment in coordination with authorities. Our attacks show that an adversary can control traffic infrastructure to cause disruption, degrade safety, or gain an unfair advantage.
We make recommendations on how to improve existing systems and discuss the lessons learned for embedded systems security in general.”

It would be nice to read one day down the street:

“Power Flows Forever” ;-)

Click HERE for the paper.

These findings are to some extend applicable to any application domain with similar topologies. The lessons learned could be applied for power delivery infrastructures, too! Or?

Next time you experience a long waiting queue at an intersection or a power black out: It may have been caused by a security flaw.

Note also: No Power no traffic lights!

IETF RFC 7326: Energy Management Framework

The RFC 7326 (just published) defines a framework for Energy Management (EMAN) for devices and device components within, or connected to, communication networks. The framework presents a physical reference model and information model. The information model consists of an Energy Management Domain as a set of Energy Objects. Each Energy Object can be attributed with identity, classification, and context. Energy Objects can be monitored and controlled with respect to power, Power State, energy, demand, Power Attributes, and battery. Additionally, the framework models relationships and capabilities between Energy Objects.

Click HERE for accessing the RFC 7326.

The document refers to several parts of IEC 61850. Many of the IEC 61850 objects related to electric measurements like 3-phase voltage and current are modeled in corresponding MIBs.

Click HERE for the list of related documents of the working group EMAN.

The availability of the communication infrastructure (ICT – Information and communication technology) is very crucial for power delivery systems.

Be aware that:

No ICT –> No Power
No Power –> No ICT
No Power and no ICT –> No Life

The two infrastructures are very closely interwoven. We need ICT systems that have reasonable UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) in order to help restore power systems after a blackout.

ERDF (French DSO) has taken measures to coordinate with ICT companies in order to get the needed support for fast restoration of power:

“On the strength of its experience in crisis management, in June 2012 ERDF signed a partnership agreement with the three leading telephone operators, Bouygues, Orange and SFT, to consolidate information exchange in the event of a major event or crisis situation. The four companies were keen to pool information which is vital to the mobilisation and implementation of emergency procedures during crisis situations in order to restore their networks as rapidly as possible.”

Click HERE for an ERDF Press kit on the issue.

Close inter-dependencies between these infrastructures should be understood an should be avoided that use of electricity is blocked because my mobile service is still down. So if I have electricity in my home, I wouldn't want to wait for ICT to come by so that I can begin washing or cooking.

Sensitive, Critical Infrastructure is Not Sufficiently Protected

Recently it was reported that the Stadtwerke Ettlingen (Southwestern Germany – some 15 km from my hometown Karlsruhe), came very close to shutting down the power, water and gas supply of Ettlingen. “The experiment has shown that sensitive, critical infrastructure is not sufficiently protected,” said Eberhard Oehler, managing director of the utility, Stadtwerke Ettlingen.

Click HERE for a brief Report in English and Here for one Report in German.

Utility cuts IT workforce, hires Indian outsourcers

Northeast Utilities (NU) in Connecticut (USA) confirmed plans to outsource IT work to India-based outsourcers; move will affect some 200 jobs

Northeast Utilities confirmed the other day that it plans to turn over part of its IT operations to two India-based outsourcing firms, despite a recent push by state lawmakers to keep it from doing so.

NU says it employs some 400 IT workers, and "will retain about half of those employees" after turning some operations over to outsourcers Infosys and Tata Consultancy Services, two of India's largest IT firms.

Click HERE for more details.

Could this be a solution for automation, control, monitoring … ?

Here is another question somebody brought up discussing the NU approach:

“Would you outsource the autopilot to some inexpensive pilot on the ground in some foreign country with cheap labor? No? Then why is anyone even discussing such options for SCADA? And yet, they do!

The problem is education. Many utilities are putting poorly educated, poorly trained staff at the controls of our infrastructure, and then because it fails all the time, are seriously contemplating outsourcing the whole operation to another country.

Outsourcing to the cloud doesn't work. It's not about the technology. It's the people.”

I would add to state that another crucial problem is the education of people that make these decisions to outsource managing our infrastructure.

OSCE publication on Energy Infrastructure Protection

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has published a comprehensive report titled:

Good Practices Guide on Non-Nuclear Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (NNCEIP) from Terrorist Attacks Focusing on Threats Emanating from Cyberspace

The 100 page Guide is a very comprehensive document that states at the beginning that “The importance of energy security and energy infrastructure security cannot be overstated. It is among the most serious security, economic and environmental challenges of both today, and the future.”

The report is worth to read – but it would be more important if vendors and users of the energy infrastructure and the energy automation infrastructure would increase investments in implementing the basic measures to secure both systems. Unfortunately the implementation of these measures are not a business case to increase the profit of an utility!

The challenge with the future energy infrastructure is this: to manage the Cost and Lost. Both infrastructures (energy and energy automation) will require huge amount of investment to keep the energy delivery stable, secure, reliable, and resilient (Cost) and deal with more renewable energy (Lost in the sense of relative reduction of traditional bulk generation and transmission).

Almost everything about security has been said – but not by everybody. Let’s move on with more implementations of security measures.

Click HERE for the complete guide.