ENTSO-E Strongly Supports IEC 61850 for Substation Automation

ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) wants to become “an important stakeholder in the IEC 61850 improvement process and will actively contribute, mainly through the profiling work of the IEC 61850 standard.”

ENTSO-E has just published an update on their current and future support of IEC 61850.

I very much appreciate the efforts of the European Transmission System Operators!

Click HERE for the latest news.

The electrical power delivery system is composed of many other domains that are beyond the substations in transmission systems:

• Conventional Power Generation
• Wind Power Plants
• Hydro Power Plants
• Distribution systems
• Renewable Energy Resources
• Load centers (like factories, petro chemical plant, …)
• Power quality monitoring
• Virtual Power Plants
• Primary, secondary, and tertiary control
• Load shedding
• …

IEC 61850 is about to be used in all of these application domains – to become a Seamless Information Exchange System.

Many pilot implementations and tests are underway in these domains. Usually using proprietary Information Exchange System, because the main objectives of these projects are mainly related to power system dynamics and stability – one way or the other. Later they figure out: Hey, we have a very successful project … but created many proprietary, non-interoperable Information Exchange Systems.

It is highly recommended to use IEC 61850 from the scratch! Because this is THE standard. There is usually no need to spend money and time to develop something specific for one use case.

On my radar screen I see many people starting to use IEC 61850 – users and vendors … and system integrators. All over.

Resume: ENTSO-E is just ONE of MANY efforts to apply IEC 61850.

An Approach to Developing Power Grid Control Systems with IEC 61850 and IEC 61499 and Holonic Control

An interesting paper discusses the combined use of IEC 61850 and IEC 61499:

An Approach to Developing Power Grid Control Systems with IEC
61850, IEC 61499 and Holonic Control

by Valentin Vlad, Corneliu Buzduga, and Calin Ciufudean (University of Suceava, Romania)

WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS, Volume 13, 2014

This paper presents some models and concepts for developing smart power grid control systems based on holonic concepts and the open standards IEC 61850, IEC 61499. Along with the proposed holonic models for different levels of control, we present a simple fault protection application illustrating how the IEC 61499 artifacts can be used for modeling and implementation of IEC 61850 compliant applications.

Click HERE for the above paper.

Additional information of using IEC 61850 and IEC 61499 in Distributed Power Systems:

Distributed Power System Automation With IEC 61850, IEC 61499, and Intelligent Control (Neil Higgins, Member, IEEE, Valeriy Vyatkin, Senior Member, IEEE, Nirmal-Kumar C. Nair, Senior Member, IEEE, and Karlheinz Schwarz, Member, IEEE; IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS, 2010)

Multi-agent Smart Grid Automation Architecture based on IEC 61850/61499 Intelligent Logical Nodes (G. Zhabelova, V. Vyatkin, Senior Member IEEE; IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, 2011)

More to come.

Could a Power Outage of an Airplane happen in the Air?

Yes, a power outage of an modern airplane could be caused by a simple software problem – related likely to a wrong assumption. What does this mean for the future power systems?

The following official report from the U.S. Government FAA, dated May 01, 2015 says that a

“Boeing Model 787 airplane that has been powered continuously for 248 days can lose all alternating current (AC) electrical power due to the generator control units (GCUs) simultaneously going into failsafe mode. This condition is caused by a software counter internal to the GCUs that will overflow after 248 days of continuous power. …

The software counter internal to the generator control units (GCUs) will overflow after 248 days of continuous power, causing that GCU to go into failsafe mode. If the four main GCUs (associated with the engine mounted generators) were powered up at the same time, after 248 days of continuous power, all four GCUs will go into failsafe mode at the same time, resulting in a loss of all AC electrical power regardless of flight phase.”

Click HERE for the full report.

What is the lesson we can learn from this situation? I guess simply this: If you have to program something you need to know precisely under which assumptions the “something” should work. Usually you have to make firm assumption under which the “something” will work. If you would assume (for example) that an airplane of model 787 would never be powered continuously longer than 90 days, then the counter would not overflow under normal conditions.

But: If this assumption is wrong, then the counter could overflow.

I guess that we quite often design systems under assumptions that may be valid at time of the design – but that may show later that they were quite wrong! Some 40-50 years ago it was not assumed that the traffic in 2015 would be as is is now. Or?

The power utilities assumed some 15 years ago that PV-Power (mainly installed on roofs) should just be understood and treated as negative power connected to the grid – so that there was no need to invest in power management and automation systems. I remember such discussions in the German national standardization (DKE). Within a short time period they had to learn that the assumption was wrong! Now we have almost 40 GW of installed PV systems.

The next wrong assumption could likely be the number of Batteries connected to the power grid. The needed investment in the future power system will highly depend on the assumption on how fast the installation of batteries will happen! I have talked recently to utility experts that they fear a fast growth of network connected batteries. The batteries behave different compared to Wind Turbines and PV systems – batteries can import and export energy. They can change their behavior within very short time. A sudden huge power flow change of millions of battery systems could cause power outages.

So, MUST we assume that this could easily happens or not? Depending on our answer, we have do spent more or less Euros or Dollars … Experts that don’t want to invest a lot more will argue, that it is unlikely to happen.

The (wrong) assumptions of today could likely be the reasons of power outages in the near future. The bad side of the assumption that the installation of battery systems will grow fast is: It will require a lot of more efforts to keep the power system reliable.

I guess we will see increasing numbers of batteries being installed after yesterdays announcement (May 01, 2015) of the new Partnership for Global Energy Transformation: LichtBlick (Germany) integrates Tesla Battery Storage (US) into Energy Markets.

A crucial key component in the future power systems is related to information management and standardized information exchange with IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850. VHPready is an important step to support LichtBlick and many other companies.

Will Information Networks become the “Backbone” of the Power System?

Information sharing between any kind of intelligent devices is a crucial need for today’s an the future Power Delivery Systems. It requires a huge infrastructure to send information back and forth.

Who do you think will put a lot of efforts into the infrastructure to get control over the information to be shared? Will protection engineers or mechanical engineers (e.g., of wind turbines) gain control over the information infrastructure? I guess that it will work the other way around: The specialists of network infrastructure will have a big impact on how the information will be shared in future.

One of the many activities is supported by a special group within the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force): Energy Management (EMAN)

Excerpt from the current Applicability Statement

“Abstract

The objective of Energy Management (EMAN) is to provide an energy management framework for networked devices. This document presents the applicability of the EMAN information model in a variety of scenarios with cases and target devices. These use cases are useful for identifying requirements for the framework and MIBs.

…

1. Introduction

The focus of the Energy Management (EMAN) framework is energy monitoring and management of energy objects [RFC7326]. The scope of devices considered are network equipment and their components, and devices connected directly or indirectly to the network. The EMAN framework enables monitoring of heterogeneous devices to report their energy consumption and, if permissible, control. There are multiple scenarios where this is desirable, particularly considering the increased importance of limiting consumption of finite energy resources and reducing operational expenses.”

Click HERE for the current “Energy Management (EMAN) Applicability Statement, draft-ietf-eman-applicability-statement-10”

From an information sharing point of view there is no difference between information of a router or Ethernet Switch and a protection, monitoring or control IED (Intelligent Electronic Device) in the sense of a Fieldbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850.

Finally IETF could play a major role in the world of networked devices – including everything that is believed today as somehow special: Field devices on one of the hundreds of fieldbusses, IEDs in the Power delivery systems, etc.

If you are looking for a unique (single standard) that is accepted and used all over the globe: It is IEC 61850. Use the ORIGINAL. A mapping of the IEC 61850 objects (IEC 61850 Logical Nodes and DataObjects) onto a MIB and SNMP could make sense – especially when the structures are used unchanged. The same is true for a mapping of specific MIBs for Ethernet Switches and Routers. This is already happening in IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2 for some network related information, e.g., in:

LN LCCH: Physical communication channel supervision:

More to come.

The motto of NettedAutomation GmbH since 2000 is: “The Net is The Automation”.

Cyber Security in Industrial Control Systems – Is this enough?

Cyber security is more than a hype. Is this enough to reach a secure and stable power system? No!

I found a very good documentation on cyber security measure:

Since February 2013, industrial stakeholders (final users, vendors, integrators, professional organizations, etc.) and French governmental entities have been working together on elaborating concrete and practical proposals to improve the cyber security of critical infrastructures.

The first results of this working group are the following two documents:

• The first document describes a classification method for industrial control systems and the key measures to improve their cyber security.
• The second one gives a more in-depth description of applicable cyber security measures.

Click HERE for the website with the links to the two documents. Nice reading!

These measures (comparable to those listed by many other organizations and groups) will help to improve the cyber security of critical infrastructures. No question.

Do these measures help to keep the power flowing, help to keep a stable and highly available power system? To some extend these measures solve mainly issues that are caused by new control system solutions based on standards like Ethernet and TCP/IP.

But: What’s about the power system stability? Let’s assume that we have a 100 per cent cyber secure ICS managing the power generation, transmission, distribution, storages, and loads. This “secure” systems may be used in many different ways – taking the physical laws seriously into account or ignoring some basic requirements to keep the power system stable.

One very critical impact on the electrical system is the change of power flow. Each change (more or less generation or load) has to be controlled in a bunch of close loop control systems. If the amount of change in a short time (within seconds) is too high, then the systems is likely to black-out.

A highly secure ICS may be used to configure schedules for feeding power into the power system (generator or storage) or drawing power from the system. The power flow change caused by schedules may exceed the maximum value that can be automatically managed by primary power control systems … risking a power outage.

Who is now responsible that the maximum allowable power flow change in an interconnected power system will be taken into account when we have millions of such schedules? Maybe too may schedules are configured to draw power or feed in starting at 14:00 h today. As a consequence the power flow change could be far beyond the maximum amount that can automatically be managed by the primary power control system (as we have them today in all systems).

Cyber security of ICS is one aspect – system stability of the power system is another. Secure ICS’s are important. A high level of power systems stability is more important and requires secure information and communication systems AND the need of understanding of the power system physics. 

We have to make sure that any new ICS approach does not allow a huge sudden power flow change! This is true also for all solutions based on standards like IEC 60870-5-10x, DNP3, IEC 61850, or …

These standards would allow to disseminate immediate control commands or specify schedules.

WHO is in charge to have the big picture in mind – to configure power systems in a way that they do not blackout because of commands and settings communicated by highly secure ICS’s? The power system could not differentiate if these commands or settings are intended or caused by hackers.

It is highly recommended to keep an eye on the power system physics and prevent any ICS action (secure or insecure) to danger the stability of the power system!

Just published: Draft 61850-90-17 – Using IEC 61850 to transmit power quality data

IEC TC 57 has just published the 52 page Draft IEC Technical Report 61850-90-17 – Using IEC 61850 to transmit power quality data (57/1488/DC).

The document is available for comments until 2014-10-10.

Contact your TC 57 National Committee for a copy.

Phenomena considered in the draft are related to:

• Power frequency
• Magnitude of the supply voltage
• Flicker
• Supply voltage dips and swells.
• Voltage interruptions
• Transient voltages
• Supply voltage unbalance
• Voltage harmonics
• Voltage interharmonics
• Mains signalling voltage on the supply voltage
• Rapid Voltage Changes (RVC)
• Underdeviation and overdeviation
• Magnitude of current
• Current recording
• Harmonic currents
• Interharmonic currents
• Current unbalance
• Frequency deviation
• Supply voltage variations
• Voltage unbalance
• Harmonic voltage
• Interharmonic voltage
• Voltage fluctuation and flicker
• Mains signalling and voltages

This draft is intended to increase the interoperability between power quality monitoring systems and any application that needs the corresponding information for operation or post mortem analysis.

Optical Fibre for Temperature Measurement in Power Systems

Optical fibres are known to be used in power systems because they withstand the rough conditions in high voltage environments – as such they are used in Substations for carrying messages, e.g., according to IEC 61850.

There is another very interesting use case of optical fibres in power systems: in generation, transport, distribution, and loads. One of the crucial measurements that can be applied to more efficiently use of electric power is measuring temperatures. But you may state that installing a lot of temperature sensors could be quite expensive!

With the application of optical fibre for measuring temperatures it seems to be a very promising approach to reduce the amount of power needed for many critical process like in huge data centers, high voltage lines and cables, transformers, switch gears, to name a few.

According to alquist (a UK based company specializing on measurement systems using fibres) there are many advantages of fibre as a temperature sensor:

• Simultaneously measures temperature and position over long distances
• Low cost – the sensor is made from standard 50/125 optical fibre zip cord - very cost effective
• Immune to shock/vibration and electromagnetic interference
• No electronics, wireless, batteries or moving parts in monitoring zone. Totally passive, minimal maintenance.
• Inherent high reliability (fibre has a design life of 30+ years)
• High temperature range -200°c to +500°c
• Extremely small for access in legacy areas with restricted space
• Easily installed in without any downtime or interruption of service

There are an incredible number of applications for fibre optics beyond their use as a simple communications links.

Download a very useful presentation given by Andrew Jones (alquist) [pdf, 2.8 MB]

The availability of myriads of “measurement signals” from various processes allows to more efficiently use energy, i.e., to reduce the amount of energy we need to consume to service our needs for modern life.

What ever will be measured in energy supply systems could be modeled and communicated with IEC 61850 – The Communication Standard for power system automation. One crucial focus of IEC 61850 is on measurements!

Details of Inverter-based DER Devices Modelled in IEC 61850-90-7

Functions and Information Exchanges for Inverter-based DER Devices are modeled in IEC 61850-90-7. What does this document provide? A lot of useful models for real functions needed (today and in the near future) in power distribution systems with massive renewable power fed into the grid. The main models can be found in a document published the other day (see link below).

You can find many functions described and modeled in IEC 61850-90-7, e.g., frequency-watt mode:

This frequency-watt mode addresses the issue that high frequency often is a sign of too much power in the grid, and vice versa. These extreme deviations from nominal frequency can cause grid instability, particularly if they cause significant amounts of generating equipment to trip off-line.
One method for countering this over-power problem is to reduce power in response to rising frequency (and vice versa if storage is available). Adding hysteresis provides additional flexibility for determining the active power as frequency returns toward nominal.

The IEC 61850-90-7 has been written to meet crucial needs in the power delivery system. This document has to be seen in conjunction with other standards as depicted in the UML diagram below:

 

The electrical measurements like voltage, current and frequency are defined in IEC 61850-7-4 Ed2.

Note that the conversion of almost all models into UML (Enterprise Architect) will be completed soon. The huge model will be used to maintain the models in future. This is a crucial step toward tool based standardization.

Download the models based on IEC 61850-90-7 [pdf, 1.1 MB]