How are IEC 61850 Information Models related to Functions?

The common understanding of information is crucial for the understanding of the related functions that produce, consume, and exchange the information. Information is always "bound" to functions ... no function - no information.

Let's have a look at this function: 

Supervision of a temperature value ... report an alarm to a well known entity when the temperature change rate reaches a value of xyz ... this is the FUNCTION. Now we model it with IEC 61850:

The temperature supervision is modeled in the logical node MySTMP1. We use the data objects Tmp (reported every x minutes), RteAlm (reported when the value of the RteAlmSet is reached, e.g., 0.5 K/s).

This "function" is described in an SCL document ... here the MySTMP1 is bound to a topology (SSD), e.g., room temperature in building so-and-so, the reports are sent to the SCADA system mySCADA-client, ... the factory acceptance test can more or less be automated based on the SCL document.

The IEC 61850 STMP logical node model follows the temperature supervision function!! 

The function was there well before IEC 61850 was born!

IEC 61850 standardizes the information shared with a real function.

The following diagram shows the basic modelling approach in IEC 61850:

• IEC 61850-7-2 defines the foundation
• IEC 61850-7-3 defines the common data classes: MV for measurements, SPS for single point status, and ASG for analogue sessings.
• IEC 61850-7-4 defines the logical node and data object classes.

More details will follow ... stay tuned.

The real challenge with IEC 61850 is: You likely get the feeling when you start reading hundreds of pages: unable to see the wood for the trees.

Let me know if you need help ... after 30 years I can support you.

How To Bring Plant Engineers To The Table When Cyber Issues Are Discussed?

In my career as electrical and IT engineer I have experienced that engineers are quite often not invited to discuss the measures and plans for critical infrastructure protection with IT personnel.

It is completely different compared to the world of electric power system protection - I mean the applications of protection relays. Protection engineers are (in my understanding) the most crucial engineers. They are very important for the reliable delivery of electric power. Protection engineers are likely to attend any meeting when it comes to the reliability of the power flows. Protection engineers know what to do ... software people may help to implement the "what" and the IT personnel may help to solve the communication issues ... but the crucial parts are dominated by protection engineers!

Mr. Vytautas Butrimas, a globally well known engineer involved in cyber security of control systems has briefly discussed the "Berlin wall" between IT personnel and plant engineers.  

Click HERE for the four page paper written by Mr. Butrimas.

Either of the groups involved believes that his or her group is the center of universe. There is little communication between the IT personnel and the engineers. 

There are so many semipermeable walls between, e.g., politicians, company lawyers, economists, IT experts, and plant engineers. There is usually no way that experts from any layer are allowed to talk to the experts from the other layers. In the end: Each layer feels independent of the other layers ... which leads to what we see these days ... and may be even more in the future. Have you heard of a discussion between a power protection engineer and a lawyer or even a medical doctor?

It would help medical doctors to understand the basics of electric power system reliability ... and so on. Because medical doctors (and all other people of a society) depend 100% on available power.

So in the end: (Electrical) Engineers should be honored by the society ... the problem may be that the engineers are not wearing white coats but wear safety boots, safety helmets, goggles,  protective gloves, ... a single doctor may harm a few people ... a protection engineer may harm millions of people during a blackout caused by a misconfiguration of protection equipment.